The Horn of Africa and the Limits of a Calculated Move: Why Unilateral Recognition of Somaliland Raises Regional Alarm

Muhannad Awad Mahmoud
Mogadishu’s rejection of any move towards recognising Somaliland was neither a fleeting political stance nor a routine defensive statement. Rather, it reflected a clear awareness that this file is no longer a purely internal Somali matter, but one that directly affects the balance of the entire Horn of Africa. In this region, issues of sovereignty and secession cannot be treated as bilateral questions, because their repercussions quickly spill beyond national borders and reverberate across a highly sensitive regional environment.
When Mogadishu announced its rejection, it was not addressing Hargeisa alone. It was sending a message to all regional and international actors that any change in the status of sovereignty within the Horn of Africa would have consequences extending beyond the immediate parties, impacting the stability of a region already marked by political and border fragility. This explains why the position was firm in its language and anchored within a broader African and regional framework.
The reported Israeli moves towards Somaliland should not be understood solely through the lens of legal recognition. Recognition is rarely the starting point of a process; more often, it comes after testing the political environment, the limits of regional acceptance, and anticipated reactions. The core question here is not whether recognition would be legal, but rather: what drives an external actor to take an interest in Somaliland at this particular moment, and what consequences might follow in a regional setting that cannot afford difficult-to-reverse decisions?
The first reason is clear and needs little interpretation: geography. Somaliland overlooks the Gulf of Aden and lies close to Bab al-Mandab, one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors. This geographic value exists in its own right, independent of the territory’s legal status. Historically, many states have engaged with regions and entities lacking formal recognition when strategic location imposed itself as a reality. The objective has often been to secure access, monitor developments, and build practical relationships at key nodes of trade and security.
The second reason relates to the nature of engagement with de facto stable entities. International relations draw a clear distinction between recognising an independent state and establishing practical, non-sovereign relations. Northern Cyprus offers a clear example: since its declaration in 1983, it has been recognised by only one state, Türkiye. Yet it has not been isolated from the world; economic, educational, and tourism interactions have taken place through informal arrangements, and the European Union has had to adapt to the reality of division, despite formally recognising only a unified Cyprus. Even so, this engagement never translated into political legitimacy, as recognition remained a red line that regional and international balances would not allow to be crossed.
The same logic held in Kosovo, where practical engagement preceded political recognition by years, and in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which developed extensive international and economic relations without these being translated into international recognition of secession. When the region attempted to go beyond the ceiling of autonomy in 2017, regional and international rejection was swift and decisive. These precedents confirm a well-established rule: engagement with reality is possible, but transforming that reality into a recognised state requires broad regional consensus, not a unilateral decision.
From this perspective, Mogadishu’s firm stance becomes understandable, as does its alignment with the African Union and IGAD. The Horn of Africa is a region whose sensitive files remain unresolved. In Somalia itself, debate continues over the shape of the state and the relationship between the centre and the regions. In Ethiopia, the legacy of the Tigray conflict remains present, alongside ethnic tensions in Oromia and other regions, making any successful secessionist precedent in the neighbourhood a direct source of concern.
In Djibouti, sensitivity towards any path perceived as encouraging a redefinition of sovereignty stems from precise historical and geographical considerations. The small state was built upon a fragile internal balance between two main components: borders of highly sensitive areas adjacent to Eritrea and Ethiopia, and has previously experienced border tensions with Eritrea in the Ras Doumeira area. Although Djibouti is today among the more politically stable states in the region, this stability rests largely on avoiding the opening of regional debates over secession or border changes. From this standpoint, Djibouti views any precedent of unilateral recognition in its vicinity with concern—not out of fear of imminent internal secession, but out of apprehension that such a move could re-politicise old border files or draw the region into a new competition for influence that threatens its sensitive position at the entrance to the Red Sea.
Kenya’s sensitivity differs in form but is similar in substance. The country does not currently face an active secessionist movement, but its political memory carries the heavy legacy of the “North Eastern Province” file, which in the 1960s witnessed an armed insurgency linked to demands for union with Somalia. Although this file was officially closed decades ago, Nairobi has historically remained cautious about any Somali developments that might revive debates over identity and sovereignty in its border regions. Moreover, Kenya has a direct stake in Somalia’s stability for security and economic reasons, and fears that recognising Somaliland would further complicate the Somali scene, weaken the central state, and negatively affect the security of its long border with Somalia and its own internal security environment.
In this context, unilateral recognition becomes a highly sensitive step. The immediate risks begin within Somalia itself. Merely raising the prospect of recognition by an external party alters the behaviour of local actors: some may view external recognition as political backing that reduces their willingness to enter internal compromises, while others perceive it as an existential threat requiring greater rigidity. This dynamic raises levels of polarisation, weakens prospects for internal understanding, and drains the central state’s capacity in political confrontation rather than directing it towards addressing security challenges and building institutions.
At the same time, the impact extends to the region through heightened, if undeclared, tension in the Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandab. The formal entry of a new actor into this maritime nexus does not necessarily imply military confrontation, but it does prompt other states to recalibrate their positions through quiet balancing policies—such as expanding partnerships, enhancing logistical presence, or intensifying maritime monitoring. These moves are rarely announced, yet they accumulate tension, making the region more sensitive to subsequent developments.
Indirect risks surface more slowly but have a deeper impact. The first is the erosion of commitment to the principle of borders and sovereignty on a continent acutely sensitive to secessionist precedents. Any case perceived as having succeeded in securing external recognition becomes a political reference point in other debates, even if it is not replicated in practice. The second is the shift of the centre of gravity from internal settlements towards reliance on external actors, transforming containable disputes into complex regional and international contests.
Within this framework, the precedent of the Hanish Islands dispute between Yemen and Eritrea acquires particular significance when read carefully. The dispute over Greater Hanish, Lesser Hanish, and Zuqar escalated into a military confrontation in 1995, before being resolved through international arbitration by a ruling issued in 1998. The importance of this precedent lies not in the islands themselves, but in the principle it established: sovereignty disputes in the Red Sea can be legally contained and prevented from escalating into open regional conflicts. This approach offered an alternative to imposing fait accompli and helped safeguard the stability of a highly sensitive maritime corridor.
In conclusion, the Somaliland file has ceased to be a purely legal debate over recognition or non-recognition. It has become a practical test of how balances are managed in the Horn of Africa. The step may appear calculated from the perspective of its proponents, but it is a high-cost move in a region that cannot afford difficult-to-reverse decisions. Mogadishu’s rejection has reaffirmed a fundamental reality: in this region, political decisions are not measured by the moment they are taken, but by the chains of interaction they unleash—interactions whose effects may extend to the stability of entire states.

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