Your killer is Your Rescuer… Behind the Clashes on the Libyan–Chadian Border!

Sudanhorizon – Mohamed Othman Adam

The Italian news agency Nova published a report about a conflict that erupted in southern Libya between forces loyal to Haftar and a Chadian militia that had, until recently, operated under his command. This bitter fighting coincided with meetings held between Sudan, Libya, and Egypt following an attack on the border triangle by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), supported by a faction affiliated with Haftar. The sequence of events brings to mind our local proverb: “If God brings your killer, He brings your rescuer too” — a saying that evokes fate’s irony when salvation and destruction come hand in hand.

According to Nova’s report, published on its website last week, the recent armed attack along Libya’s southern border — at checkpoint No. 17 with Chad — has cast a spotlight on one of the most fragile and complex regions in Africa. This is a crossroads for the smuggling of all kinds of goods: migrants, weapons, drugs, fuel, and cigarettes.

The report notes that the victims were soldiers from the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General Khalifa Haftar. Accounts vary regarding how many were killed or captured by the armed group, whose origins also remain disputed.

On one hand, the LNA’s Military Media Division claimed a successful operation against “armed Chadian opposition forces” active in the area. On the other hand, persistent rumours suggest the attack was carried out by forces that had previously been allied with Haftar himself — specifically, a group led by Saleh Habré, cousin of the late Chadian president Hissène Habré. Habré had previously served in LNA’s Brigade 128, from which he was dismissed on charges of insubordination.

In an exclusive interview, Nova reported denials from Mohamed Sharif Jako, Deputy Secretary-General of the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) in Europe, denying any involvement by Chadian opposition groups in the clashes with LNA forces.

“We did not take part in any attack,” Jako confirmed. He added: “What happened at the border was an internal dispute between Khalifa Haftar and Saleh Habré. The latter was part of his forces but severed ties after being used to protect convoys linked to drug trafficking, illegal gold mining, and smuggling.”

According to the FACT leader, Haftar routinely recruits mixed militias — composed of local and foreign fighters — which he later labels as “terrorists” or “opposition forces” to justify his repressive actions and gain legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

Jako reaffirmed that all Chadian opposition groups have been outside Libyan territory since the end of 2024, following what he described as a “treacherous attack” launched by the LNA. According to him, the incident was not isolated: it was allegedly an attempt at a prisoner exchange — LNA soldiers for Hassan Musa Kili, a prominent figure in the Tebu community who was recently arrested for allegedly attempting to supply fighters to the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, Haftar’s rival.

Jako warned that failing to release Musa could lead to a broader escalation across Fezzan — a strategic region for human trafficking and migration flows that remains beyond the full control of Haftar’s forces.

In its detailed report, Nova quoted Jako as saying: “Haftar’s sons are directly responsible for the instability in southern Libya,” referring to Saddam and Khalid Haftar, commanders of the LNA’s ground forces and special forces, respectively.

“In recent years, they have exploited armed groups to manage migration flows, using irregular migration as a bargaining chip to secure funding and political recognition from Europe. It is the LNA’s own security apparatus that facilitates migrant transport to the Libyan coast, reaping direct profits in the process.”

Perhaps the RSF, borrowing from this same tactic, has also been using the fear of migration and instability as a pressure card against Europeans. This may even have been one of the motives behind the recent attack on the border triangle.

Meanwhile, Libya’s ground forces, under Saddam Haftar, announced the deployment of elite units to the border area with Chad. A recently published video on LNA’s official social media accounts shows military convoys moving by night, accompanied by armoured vehicles and special forces, passing through a well-lit base before heading deep into the desert.

The video later shows a long line of four-wheel drives and military trucks advancing in formation across dimly lit desert tracks — a clear indication of a wide-scale operation. Regarding the internal situation in Chad, Jako noted that the armed opposition had adopted a policy of containment since 2021, declaring a unilateral ceasefire with the N’Djamena government amid severe instability affecting the Sahel region and neighbouring countries like Sudan and Libya.

“We have deep historical and social ties with both the Libyan and Sudanese peoples. This is not the time for open armed conflict,” he said. However, Jako cautioned: “The Chadian regime continues to send negative signals, and this may test our patience. Our leader, Mahdi Ali, has made it clear that we have not been defeated yet.”

Shifting to the regional context, Jako addressed the growing Russian presence in the Sahel, particularly in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. He views it as “a choice made by African populations who witnessed the failure of the French model in managing international relations. France dominated the continent for decades without delivering tangible benefits — rather, it perpetuated a logic of colonial exploitation and imperialism.”

At a closed event organised by the European Council on Foreign Relations in Rome, a European diplomat sounded the alarm over Russia’s expanding narrative — one that paints Europe as a fading colonial power, while portraying Moscow as a liberator and ally.

“This type of messaging resonates deeply with young Africans,” the diplomat observed. “We must learn to communicate credibly with them, counter disinformation, and reinforce the values of truth, transparency, and good governance.” In this atmosphere of widespread mistrust — particularly toward Paris and, more broadly, the West — Russia is reportedly capitalising on the demand for alternative security and partnership models. According to Jako, “Russia offers a framework that, for now at least, is seen as more respectful of sovereignty and local interests.”

Finally, the FACT representative commented on the war in Sudan, which erupted in April 2023 between the regular army and the rebel RSF:

“We have not participated in the conflict. We maintain social relations with all parties and hope for a sustainable solution to what appears to be an endless crisis.”

Could these developments push all stakeholders to hurriedly “piece together” the unfolding situation at the triangle?

Indeed, “If God brings your killer, He brings your rescuer too” — for sometimes, whether by intention or fate, destruction may bring salvation.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=6480