The Sudanese Memory: Myths and Absurdities in Foreign Reports on Sudan (2–2)

Mohamed Elsheikh Hussein

Without any intention of entering into political disputes that may devolve into a dialogue of the deaf, the United States’ decision claiming that the Sudanese government used chemical weapons in 2024 brings back to mind our long-standing experience with foreign reports.
The American report stated that this constituted a violation of Sudan’s obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, and that, as a result, new sanctions would be imposed, including restrictions on US exports to Sudan and barring the Sudanese government from accessing US government credit lines.
This decision recalls a report issued by Amnesty International ten years ago, accusing Sudan of using chemical weapons in Darfur.
Such recurrence confirms that foreign reports are a vast sea—one in which it is possible both to swim and to drown. What follows is the final part of “Myths and Absurdities in Foreign Reports.”
(26)
The report continues its fabrications, claiming that, through satellite imagery, over 200 in-depth interviews with survivors, and expert analysis of dozens of distressing images of infants and young children with severe injuries, the investigation revealed at least 30 suspected chemical attacks in the Jebel Marra area of Darfur since January 2016, with the most recent allegedly occurring on 9 September 2016.
(27)
Tirana Hassan, Director of Crisis Response at Amnesty International, reinforces this narrative when she states:
“It is difficult to describe in words the scale and brutality of these attacks. The images and videos we examined are truly horrifying. In one video, a small child screams in pain before dying, and many images show children covered in wounds and blisters. Some were unable to breathe and were vomiting blood.”
(28)
The strongest rebuttal to these claims comes from Martin Uhomoibhi, head of the UNAMID mission in Darfur, who stated explicitly:
“Despite the presence of 20,000 military and civilian personnel on the ground, not a single individual observed symptoms consistent with chemical weapons exposure.”
(29)
He further affirmed that none of the displaced persons who visited UNAMID field clinics showed such symptoms, noting that displaced populations regularly attended these clinics.
Contact with UNAMID
Amnesty International based its report on testimonies from caregivers and survivors, estimating that between 200 and 250 people died due to exposure to chemical agents—many of them children—while failing to consult any of the 20,000 UNAMID personnel, some of whom were stationed in the very areas where the alleged attacks occurred.
(30)
The report’s underlying intent becomes evident in its assertion that the evidence depicts “a system targeting civilians without fear of international accountability.”
In effect, the organisation is pursuing a single objective: imposing sanctions on Sudan, using such allegations as a means to that end.
(31)
Accordingly, Amnesty International called on the UN Security Council to exert sufficient political pressure on Sudan to allow peacekeeping forces and humanitarian agencies access to remote areas such as Jebel Marra, and to enforce and expand the arms embargo.
(32)
Notably, the first recommendation omits any reference to chemical weapons, only for the report to later call for an urgent investigation into their alleged use and the prosecution of those responsible—if sufficient evidence were found.
(33)
The selective nature of the report becomes clear in its dramatic language and emotionally charged narratives, such as those presented by Sudan researcher Manar Idris following her visits to refugee camps in eastern Chad.
(34)
She wrote:
“I sat for hours among women in refugee camps, listening to their painful stories, fears, and hopes. They spoke of their past, present, and future. Most had lost husbands or relatives, many did not know the fate of their children, and some had been beaten, shot, or raped.”
(35)
Such narratives, despite their weak methodological grounding, are not presented naively—their purpose is clear. Tirana Hassan reinforces this by asserting that no effective measures were taken to protect civilians despite the presence of peacekeeping forces, and that international responses have been inadequate.
(36)
In reality, Manar Idris spent just over a week in eastern Chad in November 2016 conducting interviews with refugees, yet generalised her findings to broader conclusions about Darfur.
(37)
Had her research been rigorous and impartial, she would also have documented the significant voluntary returns to villages in central, western, and southern Darfur, as well as the cultivation of large tracts of land during that same period.
(38)
The absence of scientific methodology is striking. While Amnesty acknowledges the difficulty of obtaining reliable information from Jebel Marra, it simultaneously claims to have gathered compelling evidence of repeated chemical weapons use.
(39)
It reiterates its claims using satellite imagery and interviews, despite the lack of corroboration. Notably, contemporary UN reports—including that of the UN Secretary-General issued just two days earlier—made no such allegations.
(40)
In response, the Sudanese government adopted a different approach by forming a scientific fact-finding committee composed of nine experts, including representatives from chemical weapons authorities, forensic departments, epidemiology units, and national laboratories.
The committee produced a 65-page report refuting the allegations based on field evidence.
(41)
Its findings included:
Satellite and aerial images had been manipulated using specialised software.
Some images dated back to 2015 but were altered to appear as if taken in 2016.
Inconsistencies in image metadata and timestamps.
Reuse of identical images with altered clarity levels.
No evidence of fire damage in locations claimed to have been burned.
Use of image-enhancement software to fabricate destruction.
The report’s cover image was sourced from Google imagery dating back to 2014.
(42–44)
Further technical analysis revealed that many images were extracted from videos or edited in ways that removed original metadata (Exif data), suggesting deliberate efforts to conceal manipulation. Some images were edited using Photoshop and Macintosh software just days before the report’s publication.
(45)
The committee’s work represents a significant shift in Sudan’s engagement with foreign reports:
First, by adopting a scientific and evidence-based response;
Second, by providing a detailed technical rebuttal consistent with the position of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which stated that no definitive conclusions could be drawn from Amnesty’s report.
On the ground, all indicators of normal life in Jebel Marra contradict claims of chemical weapons use. If such eyewitness accounts truly existed, they would necessarily include identifiable victims. In their absence, such testimonies can only be regarded as fictitious.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=12575