The RSF’s Parallel Government: A Move to Legitimate Chaos or a Prelude to National Fragmentation?

By Muhannad Awad Mahmoud

At the end of July 2025, the so-called Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—a rebel militia implicated in widespread war crimes and crimes against humanity—announced the formation of what it called the “Government of Peace and Unity” from the city of Nyala in western Sudan. This surreal scene appears to be an attempt to impose a political reality amidst the wreckage the militia has left behind in several Sudanese states—foremost among them the capital, Khartoum—as well as Darfur, South Kordofan, Al Jazirah, Sennar, and White Nile.

The announcement featured names with a civilian veneer, led by Mohamed Hassan El-Taayshi as Prime Minister, and Abdelaziz Al-Hilu as deputy head of a presidential council chaired by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, who stands accused of committing horrific human rights violations against civilians—most notably ethnic cleansing in West Darfur, mass rape, looting of banks and institutions, and the destruction of infrastructure in Khartoum.

Having lost any political or moral legitimacy due to a catalogue of crimes documented both locally and internationally, the militia is now attempting to rebrand itself under a deceptive civilian façade. It is capitalising on political chaos, social fragmentation, and both local and international fatigue with the protracted conflict. This formation is being framed as “a new opportunity for peace”, when in truth it is a blatant attempt to impose a coup-like reality on the state through a distorted political structure that lacks popular support, legal foundation, or even a stable administrative base capable of managing a local minority, let alone representing a multi-regional and multi-ethnic nation.

The announcement of this parallel government seems a pre-emptive move to disrupt the course that had been initiated by the international Quad (the US, UK, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), or at the very least to adjust the terms of negotiation by imposing a new political equation in which the RSF is no longer merely a rebel group, but rather a “de facto authority” in certain regions.

This step could also be interpreted as a reaction to the RSF’s realisation that it is gradually losing international cover—especially as human rights organisations are systematically documenting field crimes. In this context, the declaration of a government appears to be a last-ditch pressure tactic in the face of mounting international efforts to isolate the militia politically.

So far, however, the position of the Quad appears consistent in rejecting this trajectory, which opens the door to several possible scenarios. The Quad may resort to more stringent measures to isolate the RSF politically and economically—through targeted sanctions, international arrest warrants, or tightening the grip on the militia’s external supporters. Alternatively, the parties may be nudged into negotiations that result in an imbalanced settlement that merely reproduces the crisis. In either case, the absence of a unified domestic front and a clear national programme on the part of the legitimate government could weaken its negotiating position and offer the RSF space to regroup.

This highlights the urgent need to reform the political structure in Khartoum—not merely to improve administrative performance, but to reframe the national compact on new foundations that transcend the deep polarisation that has marked previous transitional periods. Civilian and military leaders alike would be better served by initiating an inclusive domestic dialogue, one that encompasses political parties, trade unions, Sufi orders, traditional administrations, and independent national figures. The aim should be to produce a broad political umbrella that speaks for all Sudanese, not just one faction.

If conducted with sincerity and fairness, such inclusive engagement could rebuild public trust in government, strengthen the internal front, and prevent separatist rhetoric and the hollow slogans peddled by the militia from exploiting the grievances of marginalised regions.

Yet political reform alone is insufficient without an effective national mobilisation programme that educates the public on the importance of reclaiming the state, and that links government performance to citizens’ everyday concerns. The more a citizen in Gedaref, Blue Nile, or Sennar feels that their government prioritises their needs, the less room there is for the RSF to fill the void with populist rhetoric or superficial services.

This approach is best undertaken in a spirit of national unity—rising above narrow loyalties, privileging competence over affiliation, and recognising that confronting the threat of Sudan’s fragmentation requires more than weapons. It begins with building an inclusive and just national project.

The government would have done better to respond to the “Nyala Government” announcement not merely with condemnation, but through clear political measures and coordinated initiatives across several fronts. Chief among these is revitalising diplomatic engagement, which must go beyond international podiums to include direct and coordinated outreach to neighbouring countries. These states—by virtue of geography, history, and intertwined interests—exert considerable influence over the trajectory of Sudan’s crisis, whether through political stances, border control efforts to stem the flow of logistical support to the RSF, or by shaping regional public opinion. Strengthening ties with these neighbours and offering a clear vision for shared stability can help erect a political firewall against attempts to legitimise an alternative authority in the region.

In this context, it would be prudent to table forward-looking agendas that go beyond security concerns to address these countries’ immediate interests—such as trade cooperation, migration management, securing supply chains, facilitating energy and transport interconnection, and developing early warning mechanisms for cross-border crises. The more neighbouring states feel that Sudan’s stability contributes to their own security and growth, the more committed they will be to supporting the legitimate government and curbing any parallel structures seeking to establish alternative realities in border areas.

It would also serve the government well to invest in the media battle with professionalism—not by flooding the airwaves with statements, but by crafting a compelling narrative, supported by data and witness testimony, to show the world that what is being marketed as a “unity government” is, in truth, a blood-stained façade, cloaked in peace rhetoric to conceal a permanent war agenda. Sudan’s moral and political narrative must be told as it truly happened, and documented as it actually unfolded, so that facts are not confused with fabrications, and perpetrators are not mistaken for victims.

The near future may offer several outcomes: the militia may succeed in imposing this hybrid entity as a fait accompli in later negotiations; internal rifts may fracture the alliance due to conflicting interests among its components; or field defeats may accelerate, stripping the declared government of its military shield and causing its collapse. In all these scenarios, the responsibility of the official government remains the same: to act rather than wait, to forge a national equation that reconciles security and development, sovereignty and realism, firmness and openness—so that it does not one day awaken to a scene dominated by militias, where decision-making is fragmented between foreign capitals and local battlefields, and the very notion of the state, as Sudanese once knew it even in their darkest hours, is lost.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=6747