The Relationship Between Islamists and Al-Burhan: A Supportive Alliance or a Political Constraint?

Dr Al-Haytham Al-Kindi Yousif
By revisiting the recent leaked remarks attributed to Islamist figure Osman Mohamed Yousif Kibir, which opponents of the Islamists have sought to use as evidence linking them directly to Al-Burhan—and to frame the war as an Islamist war in which they control the decision-making of the armed forces—a historical reading suggests otherwise.
A careful reading of Sudanese political history shows that the relationship between Islamists and the military has never been one of subordination. Rather, it has been a complex mix of alliance and rivalry over power. The clearest example remains the 1999 split between Omar al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi, which demonstrated that even at the height of Islamist organisational influence, the military institution retained an independent centre of gravity aligned with whoever held actual command over the army.
Following what is known as the December 2019 Revolution, Islamists suffered a significant blow through the Empowerment Removal Committee, which targeted both individuals and the broader political project they had developed over decades. However, the issue, as framed here, lies not only in that process, but also in what is described as the limited political awareness of some of the leadership that emerged from that الثورة. Without realising it, they entered into confrontation with segments of Sudanese society, particularly over attempts to amend civil laws in ways perceived to conflict with deeply rooted cultural and religious values.
This dynamic, according to the argument, contributed to a convergence between Islamists and other national forces in support of the armed forces, particularly during what supporters termed the “corrective movement” of October 2021 (and opponents described as a coup). This was followed by strong opposition to the Framework Agreement, which was also rejected by the army, amid claims that it aimed to restructure the state—including the armed forces—and replace them with the Rapid Support Forces, alongside the complete exclusion of Islamists.
These developments, in this reading, formed part of the background to the war that erupted in April 2023, in which Islamist groups became involved through various battalions as part of what is described as popular support forces.
A realistic reading of current events suggests that the present relationship is best understood as an alliance imposed by the conditions of war. The claim that the Islamic movement controls the state is viewed here as an exaggeration that overlooks practical realities. Al-Burhan, as a military leader, requires every available fighting force, while Islamists possess organisational capacity and mobilisation capabilities unmatched by other groups.
Thus, Al-Burhan is seen as operating under complex calculations: he recognises that close association with Islamists could lead to international isolation, and therefore seeks to balance the benefits of their battlefield role with maintaining the independence of military and political decision-making.
One of the defining features of the “Battle of Dignity” is that it has brought together political opponents into a single trench. Alongside Islamists, there are armed movements and national forces that fundamentally disagree with them ideologically, yet fight alongside the army.
From this perspective, Al-Burhan views this diversity as evidence countering claims that the army is Islamist in nature. He needs this plurality to demonstrate internationally that the war is a national existential struggle, not an attempt to restore the former Islamist-led regime.
However, Al-Burhan also faces challenges in managing regional alliances, particularly as some regional states adopt a zero-tolerance stance towards political Islam. At the same time, these states recognise—according to this argument—that the collapse of the Sudanese army would create instability threatening the Red Sea region and potentially empower competing regional agendas, which could pose greater risks than Islamist influence itself.
As a result, some regional actors continue to support the army as an institution, while pressuring for a broader political base beyond any single current, whereas others pursue a more balanced approach—supporting Sudanese state legitimacy while maintaining historical channels of communication with Islamist groups. This, in turn, provides Al-Burhan with a degree of diplomatic manoeuvring space.
The situation has been further complicated by the United States’ designation of Sudanese Islamists under terrorism-related classifications, which is viewed here as a form of international political pressure. One potential consequence is the framing of popular resistance as Islamist militancy, which could obstruct arms procurement or even expose the armed forces themselves to sanctions.
According to this perspective, the reality on the ground is that fighters are Sudanese citizens defending their country and communities. Therefore, dissolving partisan rhetoric into a broader national discourse is seen as the most effective way to neutralise the impact of such classifications.
In this context, Islamist pragmatism is presented as a potential way out of the current impasse without undermining the war effort. This would require:
Conducting military operations strictly under the command, uniform, and regulations of the armed forces, without partisan slogans that may provoke external sensitivities.
Accepting that the post-war phase will require a new national contract in which no single political current dominates.
Prioritising citizenship over ideological empowerment, and national interest over organisational interests.
Ultimately, what is termed the “Battle of Dignity” is framed as a test of the Sudanese people’s ability to unite behind their army. Moving beyond accusations regarding Islamist influence—or calls for their exclusion from the defensive front—requires both wisdom from the military leadership and political maturity from civilian forces.
The overarching objective, in this framing, remains clear: defeating the rebellion first, and then transitioning to elections through which the Sudanese people determine their future leadership.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=12212