The Grand Losing Deal: The Sudan’s Case

On Sep 3, 2024

Eltigani Abdelgadir Hamid [1]

Translated by: Ramadan Ahmed

Introduction.
The Rise of Lieutenant General Hemedti – Was the Quartet Involved?.
Hemeti-Burhan coup and the Russian role.
Hemedti’s Coup Against Russia.
Hemeti Between the Carrot and the Stick.
Pre-War Arrangements.
The Bar Association and Its Constitutional Arrangements.
From the Lawyers’ Draft to the Framework Agreement.
(Conclusion:‎‎ Disengagement from the Rapid Support Forces.
Prospects of the Solution.
Sources.

Introduction:

There is no doubt that the ongoing war (15 April 2023–), which has claimed the lives of thousands of innocent Sudanese civilians, displaced millions from their homes, robbed them of their belongings, and violated their sanctities, will raise burning questions for each of them. These questions extend beyond political loyalties and household lootings; they pertain to the individual’s existence on the map of time and the nation’s existence on the map of place. Since this war caught many by surprise, they found themselves like the owners of a hijacked ship, asking each other: Who are these pirates, and what do they want? Did they infiltrate the cockpit through their independent cunning, or do they have “allies” among us? Do they intend to repair the ship or seize it? Are they acting on their own, or are there “bigger pirates” behind them who seize every ship by force? Should we flee and leave the ship for them, fight them over it, or “coexist” with them or what should we do?

These questions are interconnected, and they require answers. However, the answers—whatever they may be—do not solve the problem but pave the way for understanding it. Unless the issue is properly understood and its components and its network of relationships are identified, proposed solutions and hasty initiatives may only alleviate current pains without addressing the underlying disease causing those pains. In this article, we attempt to present our “understanding” of the events based on the information available to us. We will conclude with what might seem to us as “conclusions” in light of that understanding. From the outset, we must note that we do not claim to have discovered new information or documents unknown to the reader. All we aim to do is to logically connect the available information and documents and present these facts in a new light. In other words, we seek to offer an “interpretative vision” that organizes scattered information, provides appropriate answers to many lingering questions and possibly leads to potential solutions. Although the article is lengthy and of an academic nature, we preferred to publish for the general reader out of respect for our friends who follow our writings.

The central thesis of the article consists of two parts. First, most of the organized Sudanese forces (political and economic) have lost their influence, being replaced by some influential actors (in the regional and international spheres) who have been sharing the Sudan file since the last years of the Al-Ingaz regime (National Salvation Revolution). However, the presence of these forces intensified with the events of the popular revolution that overthrew the government. The second part: These external forces are not working to restore a lost democratic system, build solid civilian or military institutions, or collaborate with prominent national figures. All they aim for is to put the state’s leadership in post-revolution Sudan into the hands of what is known in social psychology as “situational personalities” that can be controlled by major actors to achieve their interests. In this view, a situational personality does not act according to internal solid convictions or a coherent intellectual vision but instead adopts the “role” imposed on him by the surrounding circumstances, making decisions or abandoning them according to the constraints of the surrounding environment. (It is worth noting that in 1972, researchers in social psychology conducted a scientific experiment to verify the validity of this concept,which became known as the Stanford Prison Experiment. A group of ordinary people was selected to volunteer to play the role of prisoners, while others were asked to play the role of guards. It was observed that after just two weeks, the “guards” had become harsh, with each playing the real role of a jailer, abusing authority, overusing force, and completely departing from the scenario. This led the supervising professor to lose control over the volunteers, requiring the police to be called in to break up the clashes[2]. The conclusion that can be drawn from this experiment is that there are ordinary individuals who, when placed under specific conditions and forced to play certain roles, may overdo it, eventually turning into a situational personality and sometimes going off-script and out of control).

However, we should distinguish between the “pragmatic” personality, which possesses its own vision and abilities but is heavily influenced by external environmental factors, sometimes yielding to them reluctantly and at other times mastering them. This creates a vast difference between and the situational individuals who only have nothing but an exceptional ability to play roles. They adopt the assigned role and performs it impeccably, only to take on the opposite role under different circumstances. These hollow personalities confuse the political scene, making it difficult for observers to determine whether the positions and scenarios unfolding before their eyes are genuine or mere acts. Are those in the driver’s seat pragmatic leaders struggling with circumstances, or are they “situational ” leaders playing assigned roles, moved by strings from outside the stage? Will they continue acting or go off script, making it challenging to control them?

It is no exaggeration to say that situational leaders have dominated contemporary Sudanese politics before and after the war. This description applies to the three main figures (Ibn Auf, Burhan, and Hemedti), as well as to their civilian counterparts. In this article, however, we intend to focus further on only one of these personalities, Lieutenant General Hemedti, not only because (firstly) he has reached a level of role-playing and event manipulation that others have not achieved—despite his seemingly simple, rural, and ignorant demeanour—but also (secondly) because external forces (both regional and international) have found in him the ideal “situational ” personality capable of manipulating secondary characters within the country and being manipulated by external forces without embarrassment. Therefore, in this article, we aim to closely examine the role these forces have played in manipulating Lieutenant General Hemedti for their purposes, as well as the role Hemedti himself has played in influencing Sudanese politics over the past five years (from the fall of the Al-Ingaz regime in December 2019 to the outbreak of the current war in April 2023). Our goal is not to dwell on this or that particular event but to look for connections between them and identify the general direction in which they are heading. Our methodology consists of questioning, hypothesizing, and verifying; that is, we will pose questions that we consider necessary, propose logical answers, and then attempt to verify whether the available facts support or contradict our hypotheses. After careful consideration, we have managed to formulate the following ten questions:

Did the “Group of Four” (the United States, the United Kingdom, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia) managed to elevate Lieutenant General Hemedti to the second most powerful man in the Sovereignty Council?
Was Hemedti lured—or deceived—into playing a role (along with his forces) in dispersing the sit-in at the General Command?
Has the dispersal of the sit-in become a pressure point used by the “Forces of Freedom and Change” (FFC) and regional and international forces (the Group of Four) to threaten and blackmail Hemedti?
Was the threat of the sit-in file one of the reasons that led Hemedti to break off his partnership with the FFC and orchestrate the coup of October 25, 2021?
Was the coup planned in light of “understandings” with some international powers (such as the Russian government)?
Was Hemedti’s rapprochement with Russia (and visiting it at the invitation of President Putin), along with his distancing from the Group of Four, the reason that promted the Group of Four to show him the “red card” and used the sit-in file to threaten and blackmail him for the second time?
Did Hemedti, under threat and enticement, agree to enter into a new deal with the Group of Four and their allies within the country (the FFC)?
What was the nature of that deal—if it existed? Did it involve a final break from Russia and its regional allies (Iran, China, Turkey)? Did it include, in return, a firm promise to close the sit-in file and hand over the top military authority in Sudan to Hemedti and his forces, while political power would go to the FFC?
After the catastrophic war that the Rapid Support Forces became embroiled in and the diminished role that Hemedti could play (politically and militarily), has the Group of Four’s strategy changed accordingly, and is there a growing tendency towards a “gradual disengagement” from Hemedti and his forces?
Finally, what are the most possible conclusions that could provide entry points for a solution?

The Rise of Lieutenant General Hemedti – Was the Group of Four Involved?

It is no secret that ousted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, and his intelligence leaders sought a “situational figure to carry out certain tasks. They picked Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, from the “remote areas” to lead what became known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). On the one hand, President Bashir wanted to fight the rebellious militias in Darfur with a similar militia rather than using the regular armed forces, which had been exhausted by previous wars in the south and east of the country. On the other hand, he wanted to create a buffer between himself and his own regular forces to protect him if things went wrong. When the RSF committed atrocities in Darfur in 2003, they were not disbanded as should have been done, instead it was entrusted with border security and later sent to fight in Yemen as part of the coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE (a series of mistakes piled on top of each other). Hemedti was the quintessential “situational ” figure in all these dangerous and erroneous missions. Although the RSF was legally under the command of the armed forces, it became, in practice, Hemedti’s personal force. Naturally, Hemedti began to feel that his accumulated power, which transformed him from a militia leader to a brigadier, then major general, and finally lieutenant general, could qualify him for even greater things. He started exaggerating his role, boasting of his military and political capabilities to his soldiers in the Sudanese dialect he mastered: “We hold the key to this country’s power; we are the masters of decision-making… And anyone who doesn’t fight has no say… When the government forms an army, then it can talk to us. Move forward!”[3] This statement was a clear message to both Bashir’s government and the opposing elites that the path to political power ran through the RSF and that those without an army or the ability to fight had no voice. He wouldn’t have made such a statement unless he was confident that everyone, including the president and the regular forces, needed him. However, he didn’t expect that major regional powers would need him as well. But he realized this when the authority of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen began to falter, the Houthis seized power, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE started looking for troops to fight for them in Yemen.

It wasn’t lost on observers of the Sudanese political scene that when the Arab coalition forces rushed to support legitimacy in Yemen (led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on March 25, 2015), Sudan would be asked to join these forces. It was also unsurprising that President Bashir, whose government was at its weakest, would join the coalition and send elements of the Sudanese armed forces and the RSF (led by Hemedti and coordinated by Burhan) to participate in the Yemen war, hoping for economic and political support.

However, the Yemen war didn’t open the coffers of the allies for President Bashir as he had hoped. Instead, it whetted their appetite for his overthrow. The war in Yemen made the allies focus on the Sudanese troops and the military resources Sudan possesses, which are unparalleled, not to mention the material resources such as gold, water, livestock, and coastlines. As Bashir’s government began to falter under the weight of the economic crisis and political turmoil, the major powers (the United States and the United Kingdom) and their regional allies (Saudi Arabia and the UAE) voraciously began to carve up the Sudanese file, drawing a map for the post-Bashir era. The two generals—Burhan and Hemedti—were at the top of the proposed leadership list for Sudan, with Hemedti ultimately favoured. Hemedti’s edge over Burhan can be attributed to three key traits: first, he leads a militia that is semi-independent of the regular military forces, allowing him to control and move them in a manner that is not as easily achievable for Burhan; second, Hemedti embodies the quintessential “situational ” leader, an adventurous figure capable of executing the most dangerous tasks without hesitation, unlike the cautious and hesitant Burhan; and third, Hemedti has a previous record of human rights violations (for instance, in Darfur), making him vulnerable to blackmail through that record. With this in mind, the representatives of this group of Four systematically worked to shape the political scene in Sudan, holding meetings and making agreements with some Sudanese political forces and a group of businessmen in Addis Ababa (note the role of the Ethiopian president) and in Khartoum.[4] These understandings laid out arrangements for a transitional period involving a partnership between military leadership (led by Burhan and Hemedti) and civilian leadership led by Dr. Abdalla Hamdok. This plan became known in the literature of the Sudanese Communist Party as the “soft landing” theory[5]. The United States and its regional allies feared the consequences of a popular revolution in Sudan, leading them to limit their intervention to removing Islamists from key military and security positions, creating a fragile military-civilian coalition under their supervision. This coalition would only make superficial changes that would not affect the economic structures tied to their institutions and would remain aligned with regional alliances favourable to them.

When the security committee of the former regime, under immense public pressure, ousted President Bashir and installed his defence minister, Lieutenant General Awad Ibn Auf, as head of a transitional military council, the political street (inflamed with revolution) refused to recognise the council, viewing the “security committee” as merely an extension of Bashir’s government. Hemedti also refused to participate in the council, and the United States declined to recognize it. It was not surprising that Ibn Auf (another “situational ” leader) announced his resignation from leadership just one day after taking the oath. What was unexpected, however, was that he handed power to Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the army’s inspector general, rather than to the general commander of the army. On the other hand, it was not surprising that General Burhan took the reigns of power and immediately chose General Hemedti (his partner in the Yemen war) to be his deputy, even though General Hemedti was a member of the ‘Security Committee’ of Al-Bashir’s government, just like General Ibn Auf. This indicates that General Burhan was acting according to some prior ‘understandings.’ This is further confirmed by his sudden appearance among the protesters at the sit-in at the General Command of the Army, speaking with the head of the Sudanese Congress Party, Ibrahim Al-Sheikh. It is also confirmed by the fact that the United States immediately welcomed the transfer of power to their nominees—Burhan and Hemedti—and that Saudi Arabia initially promised to deposit 500 million dollars in the Central Bank of Sudan for the benefit of their nominees. This was further confirmed when Dr Hamdok stated that the withdrawal of Sudanese troops from Yemen was up to the elected government, signalling to the regional partners that things would proceed according to the plan. [6][7]

However, the politically charged street, fueled by the revolution, was unprepared to accept this deal. The revolutionaries continued to stage a sit-in in front of the General Command, demanding the exclusion of the military component from participating in the transitional government. At this point, it became clear to the Group of Four that the prolonged mass sit-in around the General Command (April-June 2019) was an obstacle that made it impossible to complete the deal. The members of the group consulted and pressured for the ‘dispersal of the sit-in,’ leading to the crime of June 3, 2019, when military forces attacked the sit-in of demonstrators in front of the General Command of the Armed Forces in Khartoum, killing dozens of innocent civilians. Despite the horrific nature of the crime, it did not change anything in the planned strategy. A constitutional document was hastily drafted and signed by both the military and civilian components (August 2019), under which General Burhan became the Chairman of the Sovereign Council and Dr Hamdok became the Prime Minister. Although General Hemedti became the Deputy Chairman of the Sovereign Council, fingers of blame for the crime of dispersing the sit-in continued to point at him, adding to the list of crimes attributed to him and his forces.

As the controversy grew over the identity of the military forces that carried out the attack and the authority that issued the orders, General Shams El Din Kabbashi, a member of the Military Council, was compelled to present the official narrative in a press conference. He stated that the ruling Military Council had agreed with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) to clear the Columbia area without disturbing the sit-in area, and a plan was put in place for this. However, some mistakes were made during the execution, leading to unfortunate events.[8] This official narrative differs from other accounts given by eyewitnesses and some survivors. Most of these accounts point fingers at General Hemedti and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).[9] The most precise and credible among these, mainly to Western governments, was the report by Human Rights Watch, which explicitly stated that the RSF opened fire (in the early hours of June 3, 2019) on unarmed protesters, killing many of them instantly, while also raping, stabbing, beating, and humiliating others, including shaving their heads, among other abuses.[10]

‎‎To address this issue, Prime Minister Dr Abdalla Hamdok formed a committee led by lawyer Nabil Adib to investigate the crime. It is said that the committee heard from over 3,000 witnesses and received more than 150 video recordings. In an interim report submitted to the Prime Minister, the committee revealed that its work was progressing steadily. However, the committee’s chairman repeatedly stated that his committee faced numerous obstacles and explicitly accused ‘government agencies of not cooperating and refusing to hand over the requested video footage from surveillance cameras around the sit-in site.’ As accusations against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) increased, General Hemedti himself was compelled to admit that some of his forces had participated in dispersing the sit-in. While addressing the “Nile Junction Initiative for Sudanese Women” at the Friendship Hall in Khartoum, he disclosed that the investigation committee had identified the main perpetrator and coordinator of the sit-in dispersal and promised to bring them to trial. He also mentioned that 14 military personnel were detained, with five of them having made judicial confessions, saying: ‘Our people are not angels, and our field courts are functioning.’[11] [12]

In any case, the sit-in area was cleared of protesters, and the parties could sign the Constitutional Document in August 2019 and form the ruling coalition. Despite what had happened, General Hemedti became the Deputy Chairman of the Sovereign Council. However, the crime and his previous records remained hanging over his head, just as planned. The Group of Four their allied civilian forces (FFC) kept this case and would wave it in Hemedti’s face whenever they sensed that he might stray from the script. General Hemedti realized that he would be ousted, and his chapter would be closed sooner or later unless this case is closed. This understanding helps explain why relations between him and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) became strained, why he worked tirelessly to obstruct the investigation into the sit-in dispersal, and why he eventually engaged in planning the coup on 25 October 2021.

Hemeti-Burhan coup and the Russian role:

Although General Hemeti and the leaders of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) were partners in the coalition government led by Hamdok, and even though the FFC leaders outwardly showed him obedience and loyalty, General Hemeti did not trust them or reciprocate their respect. Rather, he stated on more than one occasion that the leaders of the FFC do not have real popular support and do not have experience in running the state. He used to mock their management of the economy (especially the Ministry of Trade), saying about them – sarcastically – “A person who owns gold and yet he goes begging.”[13]Then he threatens them and warns them, saying: “We don’t care anymore, we have nothing to do with them? What do we have to do with them? And again, we tell a one-eyed man that he has one eye.”[14]Sometimes, he would even go so far as to say that they used to receive their salaries from foreign embassies. The disputes between the two partners escalated to a complete break, leading Hemeti (along with General Al-Burhan) to overthrow them on 25 October 2021, thereby ending the ruling coalition. It is no wonder that one of the first internal decisions made after the ousting of Hamdok’s government was the freezing of the investigation into the dispersal of the sit-in. Another decision that would have significant and far-reaching consequences was the shift away from the Group of Four and the move towards Russia. The question arises: did Russian intelligence know about the coup? And was General Hemeti coordinating with them, as some indications suggest?

The first sign of Russian involvement in the coup was the previous cooperation between the Wagner Group and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as well as the Russian leadership’s particular interest in Hemeti. President Putin had extended an invitation to him to visit Moscow. On 23 February 2022 (just three months after the 25 October 2021 coup and one day before the war in Ukraine), Hemeti, accompanied by a large delegation, including ministers of finance, agriculture, and mining, visited Russia. At that time, President Putin was preparing for his war against Ukraine (which began on 24 February 2022) and was seeking a foothold on the Red Sea to facilitate communication with his bases in the heart of Africa and ensure the flow of gold and minerals to offset the shortage of foreign currency due to sanctions on Russian exports. It was no secret to observers that Russia had been, and continues to be, determined to strengthen its influence across the African continent. It has various projects and security, military, and economic agreements, often carried out by the Wagner Group, which had previous ties with Hemeti’s RSF. Russia was also, and still is, eager to invest in Sudan’s mineral sector, a sector dominated by the RSF through companies like Al-Junaid. Understandably, Hemeti’s visit to Russia stirred considerable discontent among American and European circles.[15]

However, Russia’s desire to establish a military base on the Red Sea was not new, stemming from previous understandings and agreements. Sudanese governments had long hesitated on this matter, leading the Russian government to seek a daring leadership figure, which they found in Hemeti, a figure they began to rely on for reasons similar to those that drew the attention of Sudan’s former president and the the Group of Four. Based on Wagner’s experience in Sudan, the Russian government viewed Hemeti as a ‘situational ‘ adventurer who could break away from the norm. In the context of this geo-economic struggle between Russia and Western countries, preparations were made for the October 25, 2021 coup. Western sources were quick to assert that Russia played a role in the coup, [16]Despite official reports denying this and claiming that the visit was part of normal cooperation on regional and international issues.

Hemedti’s Coup Against Russia

However, less than six months after the October 2021 coup, General Hemeti took a contradictory stance to his initial positions. He began to distance himself from the coup and adopt the role of a democratic reformer. The rift between him and General Burhan widened as he grew closer to the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) leaders, whom he had recently criticized harshly. Hemeti then began praising the youth of the revolution and speaking about democratic transition. This raises questions: What happened to General Hemeti in the six months following the October 2021 coup? How can we explain his political shift away from his original military coup? Did he suddenly develop a conviction for democratic transformation? Did he begin to sense real security threats surrounding him? Was he subjected to pressure or threats? Was he subjected to some pressure and intimidation? Posing these questions and answering them can help us understand the sudden shift in Hemeti’s trajectory and the subsequent direction of Sudanese politics.

Many observers noted this major reversal in Hemeti’s positions after he visited Moscow and offered various interpretations. Some hasty journalists claimed that Hemeti’s statements were meaningless because they contradicted one another, reflecting a state of confusion, instability, and internal conflict that left him unable to decisively choose his stance or properly read the current political landscape and its future directions.[17] Others suggested that Hemeti might have experienced a ‘moral awakening,’ prompting him to reconsider his political positions and lean towards overthrowing the coup and handing power to civilian forces on a silver platter. In our view, these are far-fetched assumptions. Repenting of coups and embracing democratic transition are psychological and intellectual processes that do not happen overnight. If such a change had occurred, Hemeti should have resigned immediately rather than entrench himself in his ‘presidential’ position, which he used to orchestrate the coup, and certainly not pursue further militarization by increasing recruitment and acquiring more tanks, rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft missiles—as he was doing at the time. This leads us to prefer a third assumption, which we would like to substantiate in this article. The assumption is that General Hemeti was subjected to threats and blackmail from major powers opposed to Russia. But together with the threats, he was offered a ‘grand deal’ that aligned with his political ambitions (based on the familiar carrot-and-stick policy). Hemeti succumbed to the blackmail and accepted the deal. As a result, his positions shifted dramatically, reflected in carefully crafted statements stemming from that strategic ‘deal’ made with those powers. Since he was unable to disclose the details of the ‘deal’ (except to the inner circle of the Dagalo family), his statements might have seemed incoherent to some journalists. But the bitter grain of truth is that it was the journalists who were confused. So, what exactly was this ‘deal’? This is exactly what we are going to explore in the following section.

Hemeti Between the Carrot and the Stick:

When the Ukrainian war broke out, all Western powers aligned on one side, while Russia’s supporters aligned on the other. The familiar slogan of the Cold War re-emerged: ‘You’re either with us or against us.’ Only weeks had passed since General Hemeti’s ill-fated visit to Moscow. Before he could jump ship from the Russian side, he was urgently summoned to a private meeting with representatives of the anti-Russia ‘Group of Four,’ which was neither absent from the scene nor unaware of Russia’s attempts to penetrate Africa through Sudan. At that meeting, Hemeti was confronted with three highly dangerous files: the ethnic cleansing and genocide in Darfur, the Russian rapprochement, and the ‘dispersal of the sit-in’ (with all its images, equipment, and materials). These files were placed before Hemeti, and the articles related to war crimes and genocide from the International Criminal Court’s statutes were read to him. It was made explicitly clear that his fate now depended on the powers holding these files, and his destiny could be similar to that of Ali Muhammad Ali Kushayb, who faced 31 charges of similar crimes, or Lubanga, the Congolese militia leader. The Group representatives told Hemeti in no uncertain terms that he had two choices: either he could become himself accused of war crimes and genocide (after the Rapid Support Forces are declared a terrorist organization ), thus ending his political career, or he could start a new political chapter that could culminate in him becoming the President of Sudan. If he chose the first option, the meeting would end, and he would have to prepare for trial. However, if he chose the second option (the preferred choice of the group), he would need to implement three specific actions immediately:

First, he should publicly apologize for the 25 October coup in unambiguous terms (which would involve distancing himself from Burhan, the Islamists, and local leaders aligned with them);

Second, he should sever all ties with Russia (and any connections to Turkey, Iran, or their allies in the region); and

Third, he should reconcile with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) and throw his full military and economic weight behind the Group’s proposed arrangements and projects (as presented through the FFC).

In exchange for these three steps, the Group of Four would commit to the following: First, the ‘sit-in dispersal’ file would be closed entirely, along with any mention of the International Criminal Court, lawyer Nabil Adeeb’s investigation committee, or the committee of the martyrs’ families, and any similar demands for the disbanding of the Janjaweed, or justice for the dead. Second, Hemeti’s businesses and investments would be left untouched, his military support would be increased, and he would receive political and media coverage (regionally and internationally) until the deal was fully realized.

General Hemeti had no choice but to take the carrot; that is, to accept the ‘deal’ and fully comply with the Group’s decisions (thus returning to the founding platform). Since then, the representatives of major powers and their regional and local allies have realized that their previous efforts in crafting the ‘ideal situational ‘ figure had not been in vain. They moved from secrecy to openness, and their group became known in the press as the ‘International Quartet Mechanism,’ composed of the United States, Britain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. This group maintained a firm grip on Sudanese affairs through their Khartoum ambassadors, representatives, or intelligence agencies. They held continuous meetings with certain political activists whom they termed ‘political actors,’ with the ongoing aim of mediating to resolve the political crisis in Sudan through dialogue, completing the ‘political process,’ and finding a solution to end the post-October 25th coup situation. It is self-evident that breaking away from the coup and re-establishing ties with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) was at the top of the expected demands from all the Quartet members. This was due to their substantial investment in the deposed Hamdok government (with its military and political wings) and their well-known fear of political Islam and disdain for Iran. The third demand, concerning severing ties with Russia, is the main driver that may require further explanation. Why is the Quartet so wary of a Russia-Sudan rapprochement spearheaded by Hemeti?

Each of the four countries viewed Russian infiltration into Sudan (especially on the Red Sea) as a direct threat to their interests. Any of these nations sought unmatched influence over the Red Sea coasts, Sudan’s vast agricultural lands, or its precious minerals and could not tolerate a strong, hostile competitor like Russia, Turkey, or Iran. Observers note that the UAE’s primary ambition, in particular, is to become an economic hub linking East Africa and South Asia through what has become known as the ‘port chain strategy’—controlling the ports of southern Arabia and the Horn of Africa. Since it lacks a standing military force, the UAE constantly seeks local fighters (militias) to train and arm, as it did in southern Yemen or Libya and as it continues to do with the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan. If Hemeti and his militias were to pivot toward Russia, all the UAE’s investments in these forces would go to waste. By controlling Hemedti and his fighting forces, one could easily control Sudan and its African neighbours. Just as the UAE needs soldiers for its African expansion, also Saudi Arabia is in need of combat forces to act as a buffer between it and the Houthis in southern Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the United States, amidst its war with Russia and support for Ukraine, cannot tolerate seeing General Hemeti funneling tons of gold into Russia’s coffers. There is, of course, nothing more effective at restraining Hemeti’s ambitions and controlling his actions than the threat of the sit-in dispersal file and nothing more motivating than the lure of power. Through fear and enticement, the Quartet was able to secure one of the bloodiest and most dangerous deals in modern Sudanese history, as will become clear in what follows.

Pre-War Arrangements

For the “deal” to be executed with atmost precision, Hemedti followed these three tactical steps: media statements, constitutional arrangements, and military-field preparations. As for the media statements—the easiest step—only a few months after the deal was struck, Hemedti began making the agreed-upon declarations. He unexpectedly announced his handover of power to civilians. Although he did not relinquish his position as “Deputy” who orchestrated the coup, the Forces of Freedom and Change—Central Council (Saturday, July 23, 2022)—were quick to praise this prearranged declaration. They said in a statement that Hemedti’s announcement contained a positive acknowledgement of some of the demands of the mass movement, the most important being the need to fully transfer power to civilians and for the military to withdraw from politics completely.[18] Hemedti followed this statement with another[19], saying that the army had failed to correct the course and that Sudan was heading for worse. When asked if he was considering running for president, he said he had no political ambitions but added, “If we see Sudan collapsing, we will be present.” He wanted to reaffirm his new stance for the third time, and this time, he chose the state of Kordofan (where some of his tribal base is located) during his address at the Administrative Conference of the Western and Southern Kordofan States. During that meeting, he fully adopted the role of a president that was allotted to him during his meeting with the Group of Four. He emphatically asserted that he “would not allow” Sudan to revert to the pre-overthrow state of the ousted president’s regime, a reference to the (Islamic and tribal) forces supporting Khalifa Jad’s initiative. Some local newspapers did not miss this significant shift, with the headline in Sudan Tribune reading: “Hemedti makes provocative statements and criticizes the allowance of protesters to reach the palace while others are suppressed.”[20] It was clear from this that Hemedti was attempting to appeal to the youth of the revolution, who were protesting against the coup he had been a key pillar of, reiterating: “I am with the change, even the youth who insult me in the streets I am with them.” Though he did not directly attack General Burhan, he made negative remarks directed at General Kabashi, a member of the Sovereign Council and a key partner in the coup, against the backdrop of the tribal conflict between the Messiria and Nuba in the town of Lagawa, where the Rapid Support Forces were accused of siding with the Messiria.

However, statements alone were not sufficient; there had to be a suitable constitutional cover that would allow the Forces of Freedom and Change to revive what had become known as the “blood partnership.”[21] That is to say, they had to join forces with those whom they previously labelled as the “military-coup component,” thereby managing to re-establish their position in the political arena. Likewise, Hemedti needed a constitutional cover to transform from a conspiratorial coup leader into a noble democrat. This cover emerged, unexpectedly from an obscure corner, drawn up by a an obscure temporary committee of the Bar Association.

The Bar Association and Its Constitutional Arrangements:

In order for these constitutional arrangement to gain a high publicity, they were presented in a grand, celebratory manner that might serve to to give them momentum while obscuring their source and content. According to some press reports, the Bar Association building in the Al-Amarat neighbourhood witnessed an unprecedented gathering under a huge tent. Notably, the gathering was attended by ambassadors from the Quartet (the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), as well as ambassadors from Germany, Norway, Canada, Sweden, Spain, and others. The meeting was a workshop organized by the aforementioned temporary committee of the Bar Association to present a proposed draft constitution for the transitional period, which would abolish the basic constitutional document that had formed the foundation of the ruling coalition before the coup. The draft contains many provisions, but two stand out. First, it calls for the annulment of decisions issued before, during, or after 25 October 2021, including regional and international agreements (this is a direct reference to the Sudan-Russia agreement). The second notable aspect concerns the crime of the sit-in dispersal (June 2019) and the issue of immunities for holders of constitutional positions. The draft subtly addresses the sensitive and fundamental issue of the “dispersal of the sit-in at the army headquarters” by proposing the formation of a new national committee (surpassing the previous committee headed by lawyer Nabil Adib) tasked with investigating all crimes committed during the armed conflict in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. It also calls for reforming the national committee responsible for investigating the violations and crimes committed on 3 June 2019 (the crimes during the sit-in dispersal). Regarding immunities, the draft stipulates that no legal actions may be taken against high-ranking officials in constitutional or military positions regarding any legal violations committed before the signing of the transitional constitution. The draft constitution also made a significant amendment to the composition and powers of the Sovereign Council, making its presidency rotational and including among its tasks the authority to grant “comprehensive and conditional pardons and the dropping of penalties.” Thus, it was not surprising that General Hemedti was the first to warmly welcome this draft without reviewing its other provisions, as these provisions provided him and his forces with sufficient legal immunity. They also open the door for him to potentially become the head of the Sovereign Council (as the presidency would become rotational) and place him in a position where he can “grant pardons and drop penalties” if and when circumstances change and the sit-in case reaches the courts. The presence of the Quartet ambassadors at the event represents strong support for General Hemedti and a confirmation of the commitment to the deal previously made with him.[22]

On the other hand, the military component (Al-Burhan’s wing) found itself in a difficult position, as it could not openly oppose a document known to have the backing of the Quartet Mechanism. Therefore, it resorted to the approach of proposing “amendments.” Two amendments were submitted: one related to immunities and the other to the investigation procedures concerning the sit-in dispersal. Regarding the sit-in dispersal, they proposed that: “The leadership of the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) should commit to assisting and not objecting to or obstructing the following: expediting the completion of the investigation into the June 2019 sit-in dispersal, identifying those criminally responsible, forming a Transitional Justice Commission, and designing a comprehensive process involving the participation of the victims’ families to ensure truth-telling, justice for victims, comprehensive reconciliation, and institutional reform to prevent the recurrence of past crimes.” This clause was added by the armed forces, and obviously it would have posed no significant risk to them. Though on the other hand, it was really a heavy and bitter pill for General Hemedti and his partners in the Quartet to swallow. The other clause, which could potentially derail both the draft and the entire deal, was included in the second amendment proposed by the military component under the section on immunities. Instead of merely stating, as the draft did, that “no legal action may be taken against high-ranking officials in the constitutional or military positions regarding any legal violations committed before the signing of the transitional constitution,” the amendment added: “unless the action or omission constituting the violation involved a physical assault ordered directly by the top leadership, either individually or as a group.”[23] In other words, there would be no immunity for the top constitutional and military leadership if the investigation proved their involvement in the crime of the sit-in dispersal. These amendments were undoubtedly shocking to General Hemedti, as they undermined the commitment made to him by the Quartet Mechanism. This led to a complete discarding and shelfing aside both the lawyers’ draft and their committee.. It was later confirmed that the lawyers’ committee had been in fact dissolved and had no legal standing or genuine representation of Sudanese lawyers. Furthermore, it also emerged that the draft presented in their name was merely a translation of a document probably prepared by an American organization. [24]

From the Lawyers’ Draft to the Framework Agreement:

The “Group of Four” wasted no time in continuing its efforts to implement the “grand deal.” Just three months after the Lawyers’ Draft Constitution was set aside, a new project emerged under the title of “the Framework Agreement” (December 2022). This time, they gathered even larger numbers of foreign experts, accompanied by a notable media frenzy. One might wonder, is there a difference between the discarded Lawyers’ Draft and the new Framework Agreement? The main difference is that the proponents of the Framework Agreement decisively eliminated the Sovereign Council and granted ultimate power in the country—without ambiguity—to what is now called the “revolutionary forces that signed the declaration,” namely some personalities within the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC). These personalities will control the four levels of power structures: they will form the Transitional Legislative Council, select the civilian sovereign leadership (which will be the supreme commander of the security forces—effectively placing the Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on equal footing), and appoint the Prime Minister (who will chair the Security and Defense Council). As for General Hemedti, the document ensured him an independent constitutional status. He will not be under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, nor under the authority of the Prime Minister. Instead, he has been put under a civilian head of state—a position with merely ceremonial and symbolic duties. As for the RSF, it was granted independent and parallel status to the Armed Forces (to be integrated later after the Armed forces would be purified of elements from the previous regime and its combat doctrine would be changed).

However, a careful observer will notice a consistent thread running through both documents. That is, there is a deliberate avoidance of any direct mention of the crime of the “sit-in dispersal” or a clear commitment to holding those criminally responsible accountable. Instead, there is only vague language about “launching a comprehensive process that achieves transitional justice, uncovers crimes (since 1989), holds perpetrators accountable, and provides justice for the victims’ families.” As for the investigative committee formed two years ago, which has images and evidence that the Quartet members have seen, there is no mention of it—exactly as agreed upon in the “Deal”. In addition to this—and perhaps even more significantly—under this agreement, General Hemedti is no longer subordinate to the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, nor is he a “deputy” to anyone. He has effectively become the “prince-in-waiting.” Hence, it is unsurprising—once again—that General Hemedti was one of the first to enthusiastically accept the agreement, declaring on February 4, 2023, his full commitment to it and affirming that he would work tirelessly to expedite its implementation. In a direct threat to the military leadership opposing him, he said: “Get on board with the Framework Agreement if you don’t want this country to fall apart and descend into chaos.” [25]Shortly after signing the agreement, General Hemedti made an unannounced visit to the UAE on February 24, 2023. According to reports, he was received by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed, who affirmed the UAE’s support for the Framework Agreement. Not surprisingly, the Forces of Freedom and Change, who represent the third pillar of the Deal, signed the agreement enthusiastically.. What is surprising, however, is that General Al-Burhan also signed onto the document that effectively sidelines the Armed Forces he commands and lays the groundwork for the RSF to replace them. So why did Al-Burhan agree to sign the Framework Agreement?[26][27]

Indeed, General Al-Burhan was well aware of the terms of the Framework Agreement and understood that its primary intent was to sideline the military institution (and its Commander-in-Chief) and transform the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into an independent and alternative military entity, with General Hemedti elevated to the position of the new Commander-in-Chief for the next decade. So, why, then, did Al-Burhan sign the agreement? There isn’t a single definitive answer, as Al-Burhan, much like General Hemedti, often takes contradictory positions—making statements only to later backtrack on them. However, Al-Burhan was likely facing pressures—perhaps even threats—from multiple directions: from within the military establishment (internal pressures), from his rival General Hemedti (on his right), and from external regional and international forces (from above).[28] To navigate this existential dilemma, Al-Burhan seemingly opted for the following strategy: He signed the general framework of the agreement, viewing it as a set of broad principles. This allowed him to ease the pressures from regional and international forces and perhaps even gain some of their favour. He then deferred the “contentious issues” (chief among them the new status of the RSF) to the military’s representatives at the security and military reform workshop. If the military representatives agreed to this new status, their agreement would effectively validate his prior signature. However, if they disagreed—which he believed was the most likely outcome—he would then be absolved from the agreement, arguing that the military institution did not endorse it. In any case, Al-Burhan had repeatedly said that he had no intention of relinquishing power to an unelected political entity.[29] What is remarkable is that events unfolded precisely according to this scenario, demonstrating that Al-Burhan’s political manoeuvring abilities are on par with other key players in the Sudanese political arena.

However, the proponents of the agreement and the conference organizers miscalculated when they assumed that signing the general principles of the agreement would pave the way for the signing of the technical and procedural details still under dispute. These details were then delegated to what became known as the workshops. Among the most contentious of these issues (and one of the most critical) was the item concerning the integration of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into the national army, which was deferred to the military and security reform workshop scheduled for 26–29 March 2023. The disagreement centered around the timeline for the integration. The RSF insisted on remaining a parallel military force for ten years, while the national army argued that the integration should not exceed two years. This dispute led to the failure of the workshop to reach any agreed-upon recommendations, and accordingly the representatives of the national army withdrew from the discussions. As a result, one of the key pillars on which the Framework Agreement had been based suddenly collapsed.

On the external front, representatives of the Group of Four was not oblivious to the discussions within the military institution, nor did they expect the army to easily sign off on a document that would essentially dismantle its structure. In response, the Group intensified their meetings with General Hemedti to ensure his readiness to activate Plan B—e.i., his willingness to implement the terms of the Framework Agreement by force in case that the negotiations with the military leadership failed. In this context, General Hemedti’s repeated visits to the UAE during the weeks when the Framework Agreement was being discussed can be understood. It was reported that on 24 March, he made an unannounced visit to the UAE, where he held talks in Abu Dhabi with UAE Deputy Prime Minister Mansour bin Zayed[30], who reaffirmed the UAE’s support for the Framework Agreement.[31] On 4 March 2023, he announced that he had returned to Khartoum after a visit to the United Arab Emirates lasting more than a week. This visit came amidst speculations about potential military confrontations between the Rapid Support Forces and the army, against the backdrop of sharp disagreements and media exchanges between their leaders.

So, General Hemedti returned from the UAE fully prepared—by 15 April 2023—to implement Plan B, which did not fundamentally differ from traditional military coup strategies. He planned to move his heavy military units from North Darfur to Khartoum, deploy forces to seize Merowe Airport to secure external supplies, send troops to the General Army Headquarters to take control (with the associated aim of either killing or arresting the Commander-in-Chief), and dispatch forces to the state-run radio and television stations to announce the coup and the formation of a new government.[32]

To be sure, most of these actions were in line with a familiar pattern of coup measures that need no further explanation. However, what requires explanation is the RSF’s movement to the Merowe Military Airport, 350 km north of Khartoum. Why was this step taken, and does this airport hold any special significance?

Available information indicates that Merowe Airport is one of the largest airports in Africa, spanning 18 km. It is designed to handle large aircraft, with a runway that is 4 km long, capable of accommodating up to 10 planes at once. The airport also houses a supporting airbase and serves as an alternative to other military bases in Sudan. Moreover, the 19th Division, responsible for protecting strategic facilities, is stationed there.[33]

It’s clear that Lieutenant General Hemeti was well aware of the strategic value of the Merowe Airport. His calculated move to seize control of this airport was a tactical masterstroke. Had he managed to capture this airport he would have, firstly: neutralized the Sudanese Air Force early on; he would have, secondly, secured aerial military support from the country backing the coup- without relying on remote airports in Uganda or Chad, and, thirdly, he would have gained the ability to swiftly move his forces, equipment, and supplies to all regions of Sudan. So, by moving his forces and equipment swiftly and decisively to Merowe before 15 April without permission or notification to the Sudanese Armed Forces,[34] he clearly demonstrated his strategic planning. The RSF then deployed around the airport, stormed it, and captured several Egyptian soldiers (who were conducting military exercises under a protocol with the Sudanese army). The RSF even released video footage of their soldiers inside Merowe Air Base, including a clip of their commander delivering a victory speech.[35]

As expected, the Sudanese Armed Forces responded by surrounding the RSF forces and ordering them to leave the site. However, the RSF’s refusal to withdraw led to unexpected clashes. After fierce fighting, the Sudanese Armed Forces regained control of Merowe Airport. Therefore, it is important to note that the first shot of the war was not fired in Khartoum but in the unexpected location of Merowe, and the war did not begin on 15 April but three days earlier.[36]

However, despite all the resources and preparations, the coup did not unfold as expected. Hemedti’s forces failed to seize Merowe Airport and its military base, nor did they manage to kill or arrest the Commander-in-Chief. Consequently, from April 15, 2023, the coup attempt escalated into a prolonged war between the national army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Hemedti then disappeared from the military and political operations stage, becoming something of a legend, blending reality with artificial intelligence.

Some proponents of the Framework Agreement, eager to absolve Hemedti of responsibility, argue that neither Hemedti nor the national army initiated the war, but rather a “third party” opposed to the Framework Agreement. Although no substantial evidence supports this claim, let’s assume for a moment that it is true. Logical reasoning would prompt us to ask: Was this thirdparty acting in coordination with the army, or was it acting independently? If we assume that the third party was working with the knowledge and coordination of the army (due to their shared objectives), then the first shot must be attributed to both parties. However, if we claim that the third party acted independently, firing the first shot without the army’s knowledge or coordination (as some supporters of this view argue), then this third party would have effectively dealt a “backstab” to the army. Simultaneously, it would have rendered a significant “favour” to the RSF, allowing it to launch a surprise attack on the army when it was not fully prepared while also allowing the RSF to position itself as the victim of an assault. This suggests that if such a “third force” existed, it must have been either clumsy and working against its own interests or it was one of the sleeper cells operating in coordination with the RSF rather than against it. This scenario is plausible, given that the RSF had infiltrated elements within the military and security institutions.

Conclusion:‎‎ Disengagement from the Rapid Support Forces:

Just as there is sometimes a “story within a story” in literature, so too can there be a “story within a story” in politics and a war within a war. As has become clear from previous sections, there is a larger regional and international war taking place in Sudan, and within this war, other wars are unfolding. On the broader front, Sudan has become one of the battlegrounds of the Cold War between Russia and the United States. According to some observers, this war has shifted from the realm of ideology and geopolitics to the realm of geo-economics.[37] That is, Russia’s deepening involvement in Africa—seeking gold and minerals in exchange for wheat, fuel, and weapons—and its strategic positioning on the Red Sea coast to the east and the Libyan desert to the west is being countered by the United States and its regional allies, along with some European countries, particularly Britain and France. The reliance on General Hemeti and the insistence on transforming the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into a governing military power in Sudan is part of this counter-offensive. It is undoubtedly a war within the larger war.

However, the previous narrative of events also shows that the Group of Four t (the international mediators) bet on Hemeti, and the RSF has not achieved its goals. Although General Hemeti managed to play the role of a “situational” figure, steering events according to the planned strategy, and despite the military strength and regional and international support he enjoyed, his attempts ultimately failed due to four unexpected reasons. The first of these reasons is Hemeti’s early exit from the battlefield and the leadership scene (to the point that representatives of the major supporting powers could not even reach him). The second reason is General Burhan’s effective military and political leadership presence. The third reason is the cohesion of the Sudanese Armed Forces, which did not experience the expected internal divisions. The final reason is the Armed Forces’ recapture of Merowe Airport, cutting off the RSF’s anticipated ability to receive urgent military supplies via air from its supporting nations.

This early military failure of the rapid coup attempt led to a greater failure when the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) sought to shift the issue from a limited battle against the military leadership and remnants of the previous regime to a full-scale war against the Sudanese people—occupying their homes, looting their property, and forcibly displacing them. In response to this situation, some members of the quartet began to adjust their initial plan and rhetoric, replacing it with what can be called a “gradual disengagement” strategy. This strategy involved creating a distance between themselves and the atrocities committed by the RSF, promoting the protection of civilians, and delivering aid to refugees through dialogue between the generals. In this context, the exceptional Jeddah Conference (3 May 2023) emerged, sponsored by Saudi Arabia and the United States (with the UAE and the UK receding). The conference’s final statement chose not to condemn the atrocities committed by the RSF. Still, it emphasised that the conflict in Sudan is an internal matter, warned against external interventions, and stressed the need to maintain state institutions and the inevitability of political dialogue.[38] It is noteworthy that the commitments outlined in the conference’s declaration largely concern matters falling under the RSF’s responsibility, such as distinguishing between civilians and fighters, allowing civilians to leave combat areas, refraining from seizing private and public facilities, and avoiding looting.[39] The conference did not establish practical mechanisms to compel either side to adhere to these commitments. The UAE and the UK showed little interest in the outcomes or implementation mechanisms, indicating emerging disagreements within the quartet.

As the atrocities of the RSF intensified and protests grew louder, the quartet was forced to reiterate the importance of dialogue. Since dialogue required an alternative counterpart to the military, there was a need to find another “situational ” figure more acceptable than General Hemeti, whose political and military value was diminishing rapidly. In this context, the sudden appearance (on 26 October 2023) of the Progressive Democratic Forces Coordination (Taqaddum) to replace the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), which had also lost its political value, can be understood. It was not surprising that the new “situational ” figure was Dr Hamdok, who was presented by Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper as the saviour leading a Sudanese civilian front to stop the war[40] (after the failure of the military front led by General Hemeti).

The Group of Four did not resort to the “gradual disengagement” strategy out of compassion for the Sudanese people or a desire for democratic transition, nor did they abandon their primary goals. Several other factors led them to this strategy.

One of these factors was the rising condemnation of the severe violations committed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) wherever they advanced and the damage inflicted on civilians. The RSF displaced at least six million people and killed at least 15,000. Their acts of killing, looting, and destruction reached a level that the media and international human rights organizations could no longer ignore. The assassination of Governor Khamees Abdullah Abakar of West Darfur on 14 June 2023 and the mutilation of his body, gave the world a grim picture and marked the beginning of a global wave of discontent.[41] The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned the crime, the United Nations called for an investigation, and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that, based on a thorough review of the facts and legal analysis, he had concluded that members of both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF had committed war crimes.[42]

The second factor that led to the plan of “gradual disengagement’ was the military advance of the RSF and its seizure of several states, combined with the relative weakness of the armed forces, which led to the emergence of a popular movement opposing the RSF’s brutality and willingness to mobilize and fight alongside the armed forces. The strength of this movement grew with the engagement of youth (both Islamist and others) and segments of the angry public who had been displaced from their homes, stripped of their possessions, and forced to migrate and flee. This movement could form a civilian-military front that would make it difficult to establish an alternative regime led by General Hemeti, as was initially hoped.

The third r factor was that the military support received by the RSF, which enabled it to seize several states in Sudan, along with the political and legal cover provided by the Group of Four, might lead the Sudanese Armed Forces to seek rapprochement with the Russian-Iranian-Turkish axis. This was a rapprochement that General Hemeti had previously pursued and which the Quartet had made significant efforts to thwart. Subsequent events proved that this concern was well-founded. Despite all the Quartet’s efforts to widen the rift between Sudan and Russia, the Deputy Foreign Minister and Russian President’s envoy to the Middle East (Mikhail Bogdanov) arrived in Port Sudan on April 29, 2024, leading a delegation from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense for a two-day visit. He concluded his visit by affirming that the Sudanese Sovereignty Council is the authority representing the Sudanese people and their republic.[43] Additionally, Malik Agar, Deputy Chairman of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, visited Russia on June 3, 2023, leading a delegation from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Minerals.[44]

The fourth factor is that the rift among the Group of Four has begun to widen concerning the overall situation in Sudan. The United States and Britain have begun to disagree with the UAE over the course of the war in Sudan, urging it to contribute to ending the war by halting arms supplies to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Some members of the U.S. Congress have started pressing the Biden administration to take strict measures against the RSF. The Conservative government in Britain fell, replaced by a Labour government that was not part of the deal made with General Hemeti, and it is uncertain whether it will adhere to it or not. As for Saudi Arabia, it has moved closer to the Russian-Iranian-Chinese axis and is no longer as enthusiastic about supporting the RSF as the UAE has been. So, it is not far-fetched to suppose that the military position of the RSF will eventually diminish (with the absence of its leader and the death of many of its field commanders), and the views and positions among the Group of Four would diverge. In that case, calls may rise to open files on the crimes committed by the RSF during the recent war (particularly the massacres in Geneina and the Gezira). There may also be scrutiny of the military support provided by the UAE to the RSF in clear violation of the previous Security Council resolution.[45] The UAE would find itself isolated in the accusation, which would force it into one of two choices: retreat and agree to a gradual withdrawal from the “grand losing deal,” as others have done, or harden its positions—relying on its ample financial resources, bringing in mercenaries from neighbouring African countries, and revitalizing the RSF. If it chooses this path and some of its international allies follow suit, it is expected that we will witness the emergence of a “revised new deal”—a deal in which General Hemeti disappears and one of his RSF subordinates takes his place. General Burhan (or one of his deputies) from the armed forces will be invited. In this scenario, General Burhan would find himself in the same “closed room” that General Hemeti was previously placed in, facing files and offered the same carrot and stick that were previously provided to Hemeti, with added embellishments to make the new revised deal more palatable. The difference between a true leader and a “situational” one would then become evident in such a situation.[46]

Prospects of the Solution

Having said all this prompted some readers to ask me: After this long exploration, do you have a solution or outline for resolving this crisis? My answer is that I am not affiliated —as is well known—to any direct executive (political or military) position where I could uncover the hidden details and see the full picture. All I have is published and accessible information, and I aim to provide an interpretation of this information that might help others—as it has helped me—to gain a deeper understanding of the events. However, let me venture into proposing a solution. In that case, I believe it is appropriate first to examine the solutions that the general Sudanese population has resorted to in facing the assault launched against them by the Rapid Support Forces (April 2023 onwards) and to engage in a dialogue with them to address any mistakes and whether there are better alternatives.

What is immediately noticeable in this regard is that the solutions adopted by the general public do not differ significantly from the approach they took during the “COVID-19 pandemic”— attempting to coexist/then fleeing/then steadfast resistance. Evidently, in all these stages, they have resorted to the option of “individual salvation”—whether they chose coexistence, fleeing, or resistance. Let us then consider these options.

Coexistence Option:

When the situation erupted on April 15, the general public perceived it as a kind of internal military conflict between the Rapid Support Forces and the armed forces or as a conflict within the inner circles between two foolish generals. It seemed to concern the public only regarding the general national losses resulting from military coups—whether successful or failed. To these citizens, the solution seemed to be the theory of “coexistence”—that is, we must observe and wait to see who will prevail.

As the Rapid Support Forces began entering civilians’ homes in the early weeks of the war, establishing “positions” in alleyways and on rooftops, proponents of the coexistence theory believed this to be a form of temporary “preventive” tactic employed by the Rapid Support Forces due to fear of air raids conducted by the armed forces. Some even began sharing food and drink with them. When the Rapid Support Forces started tracking and detaining civilians in unknown locations, the proponents of this theory thought that the forces were only targeting former regime elements or military and security personnel. However, it soon became clear that this perspective was incorrect when the Rapid Support Forces showed their true nature. They forced women to surrender gold (or exposed them to capture and raping ) and men to hand over car keys and leave their homes. Those who refused were threatened with weapons, beaten with whips, slapped in the face, and abused in front of their children. It became evident that the Rapid Support Forces were not only waging a war against the armed forces but were also fighting against civilians, employing a scorched-earth policy by occupying homes, looting property, committing rape, and killing indiscriminately. This brutal war made no distinction between the weak elderly or women and supporters or opponents of the old regime. At this point, the option of “coexistence” completely collapsed, and ordinary citizens resorted to fleeing and escaping. Was this a viable option?

Escape Option:

As the intensity of the war increased and state institutions began to collapse, unarmed civilian citizens realized that coexistence with the Rapid Support Forces was impossible, as previously mentioned. Most of them resorted to a policy of “every man for himself”—that is, individual salvation from the grip of the Rapid Support Forces. Sudanese people fled in groups and individually in what resembled death marches. Consequently, the total number of Sudanese fleeing the war reached about ten million (some within safe Sudanese states and others in neighbouring countries). In this large wave of escape, fortunes varied. For instance, those who fled to Egypt—most of whom were from the middle class—had financial reserves or remittances from expatriate children that allowed them to live with dignity. However, those who fled to Chad (about 900,000) were less fortunate, as most of them were women and children who ended up in the Adré and Ardimi camps, suffering from shortages of water, food, and medicine and enduring humiliation and distress. Those who fled to Ethiopia found themselves in an even worse situation. They sought protection in a United Nations camp, only to be attacked by armed local Ethiopian militias that looted, killed, and drove them into forests and jungles. The bitter conclusion of these experiences is that the option of individual salvation by fleeing to neighbouring country camps is a last resort, and its advocates may find that returning to Sudan and dying there with honour is preferable to a humiliating death in Ethiopian and Chadian camps. If coexistence is impossible and escaping is not viable, could we think of a better solution ? What about the legitimate option of civilian collective defense ?

Community Defense – The viable Option:

The idea of community collective defense is not a new invention but rather an old concept that many societies facing devastating and oppressive wars have resorted to. Essentially, this idea requires:

A) an Awareness of the Nature of the War: The targeted community must recognize that the war waged above their heads is not merely a limited political-military struggle at the leadership level but a comprehensive grassroots war aimed at all of them, regardless of their ethnic components or political affiliations.
B) Rejection of Individual Salvation: The community must understand that individual salvation is not the path to survival. No matter how strong or brave an individual may be, he cannot single-handedly confront armed forces that do not hesitate to kill. Everyone must realize that the war will not stop by surrendering to an aggressor who raises his guns but will cease when the aggressor learns that their adversaries also have guns and ready to resist, as poet Hajal bin Nadhla al-Bahili from ancient times stated. C: Ownership of the struggle : It must be deeply ingrained in everyone mind that the war is their war, and no soldier will fight it alone on their behalf and no international envoy will end it out of pity. In such circumstances, the slogan “the first-order of the day is defending the nation” should be raised, the will of civilians and military personnel, the right and left wings, should be united into a single war/and or peace effort. No option other than defeat is available..

If these general principles are confirmed and most Sudanese choose to move in this direction, it means they are beginning to set foot on the path to a kind of a solution, notwithstanding its bitterness and difficulty. This may be the first time the Sudanese people face a test of patriotism and manhood. The representatives of major international powers can, of course, mobilize the Quartet and the African group,organize conference after conference, send or withhold humanitarian aid, oppose any condemnation of the Rapid Support Forces or suggestions to list them as terrorist organization or impose sanctions on countries supplying them with weapons. However, in the final analysis, they will not be able to break the will of the Sudanese people.

Sources:

Text of the Lawyers’ Document (Draft Transitional Constitution for 2022), 11/19/2022 aljazeera.net
Text of the Framework Political Agreement Document, Khartoum, Sudan News Agency (SUNA), December 5, 2022, www.https://suna-sd.net/posts/%C2
Text of the letter of the Sudanese Armed Forces addressed to the UN Security Council regarding the Rapid Support Forces, dated May 31, 2023, alrakoba.net/31834286. On June 1, 2023, a lengthy letter was submitted to the Security Council about a month and a half after the outbreak of the war. The purpose of the letter appeared to be to inform the Council about the background leading to the war. It included information on the origins of the Sudanese Armed Forces, their contributions to maintaining international security and peace, as well as the conditions under which the Rapid Support Forces were established and evolved. Additionally, the letter covered the Sudanese Armed Forces’ perspective on the issue of integrating these forces into the national army and the circumstances that led to the conflict.
Sudanese Communist Party – Central Committee, Political Paper on Developments in the Political Situation, January 24, 2024, Alrakoba Electronic Newspaper: www.alrakoba.net
Text of Sudan’s complaint against the UAE to the UN Security Council, Sudan News Agency, March 31, 2024. www.suna-sd.net/posts
Ariel Cohen, Russian Fingerprints in Sudan’s Coup, 18 April 2023. thehill.com/opinion/international/3955933-russians-fingerprints, Ariel Cohen is an expert on global security and energy policy and a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations—the publication of the prestigious Foreign Affairs magazine. The American newspaper “The Hill” wrote that a military coup took place in Khartoum on 15 April 2023, when the Rapid Support Forces launched surprise attacks against the Sudanese Armed Forces. It went on to say that Russia had direct involvement in the coup, and had a motive to stand by Hemeti. The analysis correctly points out certain aspects, but it errs in its assessment of the Russian stance. The coup described aligns with the plans of the United States and its regional allies, while the actual Russian intervention occurred on October 15, 2021, led by Hemeti and Burhan.

[1] Eltigani Abdelgadir Hamid, Ph.D., is a Professor of Political Thought at Ibn-Khaldoun Center, Qatar University. He writes intensively on Sudan politics, movements of protest and reform in the Muslim societies, and on issues of political economy. This article was originally written in Arabic.

[2]For further details about the experience see. F. Neil Brady and Jeanne M. Logsdon, Simbardo’s “Stanford Prison Experiment” and the Relevance of Social Psychology for Teaching Business Ethics, Journal of Business Ethics,Sep.,1988,vol.,9 (Sep.,1988),pp.703-710

[3]Hemedti: We are the masters of decision-making, Al-Rakoba electronic newspaper, November 30, 2017. Alrakoba.net/841962,30/11/2017

[4] The Sudanese political circles have been discussing that some of these meetings were held at the home of a well-known businessman in Khartoum, attended by the ambassadors of the Quartet group.

[5] The Sudanese Communist Party adopts what can be called the “Soft Landing Theory,” interpreting through it all the arrangements made by the Forces of Freedom and Change following the fall of the Salvation Government. The essence of this theory is that when the United States realized that the Salvation Government was on the verge of collapse, it sought to prevent a radical popular revolution, which, according to this perspective, was expected to bring about sweeping revolutionary change that could extend beyond Sudan to its regional environment. Based on this, the United States initiated the “soft landing” project, which allows for superficial changes in individuals while maintaining policies, particularly economic policies subject to the conditions of the IMF and World Bank, leading to the erosion of national sovereignty and the continuation of military alliances. Within this framework, the United States and its regional allies pressured the military component (Burhan and Hemedti) to sign a power-sharing agreement (through the Constitutional Document). Additionally, within this framework, the massacre of the sit-in dispersal was orchestrated, aiming to strengthen the authority of the Military Council. The Group of Four pressured both parties, and an agreement was reached at the home of a businessman in Khartoum, attended by diplomats from the U.S., Britain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, along with representatives of the Military Council and some opposition leaders. (See: Taj Al-Sir Osman Babu, “What Lies Behind the False Accusations Against the Sudanese Communist Party?” Sudanile, February 5, 2023, www.sudanile.com. It is worth noting that this narrative was reaffirmed in a political paper published by the Communist Party on January 23, 2024, on its page and reported by Al-Rakoba newspaper.)

The Security Committee of Al-Bashir’s government (which overthrew him) consisted of the Minister of Defense (Ibn Auf), the Head of Intelligence (Salah Gosh), the Minister of Interior, and the Commander of the Rapid Support Forces (General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti). It is not definitively known why its head (Ibn Auf) relinquished power and handed it over to General Burhan—whether it was due to popular pressure, internal disagreements within the committee, or a combination of both. However, news sources indicated that General Salah Gosh, the Head of the General Intelligence Service, was independently contacting some political forces, represented by the Sudanese Baath Party (led by Mohamed Wada’a), the Umma Party (led by Sadiq Al-Mahdi), Yahya Al-Hussein (from the Sudan Call), and Sadiq Youssef (from the National Consensus Forces). The goal was to form a Military Council and a national government based on the 2005 Constitution, with President Bashir given a symbolic presence without authority. See the interview conducted by Abdul Wahab Hemmat with Yahya Al-Hussein, leader of the Sudanese Baath Party, Al-Rakoba newspaper, October 2, 2019.

[7] BBC Arabic, 13 April 2019. bbc.com/Arabic/middleeast

[8] See Al-Kabashi’s statements in: Alghad Channel 13 June 2019. www.youtube.alghadTV June 13,2019

[9] See for example: Sadiq Youssef, a leader in the Communist Party, attacks Hemeti and the Rapid Support Forces, accusing them of participating in the dispersal of the sit-in (Al-Rakoba News, June 28, 2020).

[10] A summary of the report is available at: www.hrw.org/news2019/11/17

[11] Sudan News Agency (SUNA), 20 June 2019، www.suna-sd.net/posts

[12] See Al Sharq News Channel, a Saudi channel issued from Dubai(asharq news) 29 May 2021,www.asharq.com/politics.91912

[13] Al Rakoba online newspaper 27 July 2020

[14] ‎‎

[15] For the European reaction to the visit, see Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, February 27, 2022. www.alaraby.co.uk/politics

[16] See, for example, Ne’ma El-Baqir, CNN report, 29 July 2022, cnn.com/2022/07/29 Russia is plundering gold in Sudan to boost Putin’s war, and see also: Philip Obaji, Sudan: Russia,dw.com/en/pmc-russia-wanger-group-in-sudan,04/26/2023

[17] Nilein Newspaper, 30 November 2022

[18] BBC Arabic, 24 July 2022

[19] BBC Arabic, 1 August 2022

[20] Sudan Tribune Newspaper (27 November 2022)):

[21] The Sudanese Communist Party withdrew from the Forces of Freedom and Change (the ruling coalition at the time) on 7 November 2020, considering the FFC’s partnership with the military to be a “blood partnership” that would not lead to achieving the demands of the Sudanese revolution. See Madar newspaper, 30 September 2021.

[22] Al Jazeera Net, 15 September 2022

[23]For further details about these amendments, see: Voice of Beirut International (SBI), 15 November 2022. www.sawtbeirut/world-news 2022

[24] This organization is known as the Public International Law & Policy Group, and its team includes members of the Forces of Freedom and Change. It provides its legal services to those who wish to do so. See their website: www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org

[25] Hemeti, TV interview, Sudanese 24, 7 February 2023. Sudania24TV.com

[26] Tag Press, 4 February 2023

[27] Al-Ittihad newspaper, UAE, 24 February 2023.

[28] Al Jazeera reported that the Chairman of the Sovereign Council received a phone call from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Molly Phee, who confirmed U.S. support for the political process. (Aljazeera.net/news/2023/3/31.

[29] It is noted that Lieutenant General Al-Burhan, while renewing the armed forces’ commitment to moving forward with the Framework Agreement, at the same time points to two serious issues, the first of which is: Security and military reform is a complex process that cannot be easily overcome. It requires a close look at the military doctrine and laying the correct foundations for building professional armed forces, without involving them in political conflicts. Second: The armed forces are unwilling to empower any “unelected” political party. It is strange that everyone rushes to the first part of his statement regarding approval of the Framework Agreement, while completely ignoring the conditions he ended his statement with. These conditions, in their essence, indicate a complete rejection of the foundation upon which the Framework Agreement is based. This is because the political forces signing the framework agreement, and which will assume power under this Agreement, are undeniably “unelected” political forces. See his statement at: Fjaj Press,26 March 2023. www.Fjajpress.net/2023/3/26

[30] Sudan Tribune, 23 February 2023

[31] Al-Ittihad newspaper, UAE, 24 February 2023.

[32]In this analysis, we align with the views of Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani (editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper), who described the events of April 15, 2023, as a failed coup that turned into a war. He stated that the coup was planned by elements from the Forces of Freedom and Change (Central Committee) in collaboration with the leadership of the Rapid Support Forces. The coup plan included a civilian cabinet and a civilian Sovereign Council. See: Tasamuh News, Khartoum, and YouTube. www.tasamuhnews.com

[33] See Aljazeera.net/politics/2023/4/14

[34] See the statement by Nabeel Abdallah, the Sudanese Army spokesperson, Sudantribune.net/article272850 13 April.2023

[35] See the YouTube.AlArabia.April.16.2023

[36] It is interesting to note that how the official narrative of the RSF stressed that its forces did not start the attack and they were taken by surprise on Saturday April 15 when the armed forces surrounded them at the Khartoum Exhibition area. In this narrative no mention was made to what the RSF forces did in Marewie a few days ago See Hemedit’s statement in Aljazeera.net/news/2023/4/15

[37] See for example: Ariel Cohen, The Hill, 04/18/2023.thehill.com/opinion/international/3955933-russiasfingerprints-are-0n-sudan-coup-attempt/

[38] Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper, 3 May 2023. www.aawsat.com/home/article/4309301

[39] For the main points of the Jeddah Declaration (11 May 2023), see Aljazeera.net, Aljazeera.net/news/2023/5/12

[40] Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper, 26 October 2023. www.aawsat.com

[41] For more details about the events in Geneina and the killing of Governor Khamees, see: Reuters report, reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-politics-darfur-violence,Dec.,28,2023

[42] See the press interview with Beth Van Schaak (U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice) www.state.gov/digital-press-briefing-war-crimes.Dec 14, 2023

[43] See Anadol Agnancy: www.aa.com.tr/ar/3204736/28/4/2024

[44] About Malik Aqar’s visit to Russia see: sudantribune.et.article286526.3/6/2024

[45] Regarding the direct role of the UAE in supporting the Rapid Support Forces in their war effort, see: www.theguardian.com, 24 May2025. See: American Foreign Affairs magazine: www.foreignaffairs.com.The UAE’s Secret War in Sudan, 31 July 2024

[46] Ibrahim Shaker, Al-Khaleej Online, 5 May 2024. www.alkhaleejonline.net