The Central Bank of Sudan (Entering the Shadows): 2026 Policies Between Ambition and Implementation

Mohannad Awad Mahmoud
The Central Bank of Sudan’s policies for 2026 cannot be viewed as an ordinary policy document; rather, they signal a clear shift in how monetary affairs are managed. The phrase “entering the shadows” here does not borrow from military jargon used when an area is liberated from an extremist militia, but instead serves as a professional description of a situation in which monetary decision-making has moved away from improvisation and experimentation towards a higher degree of discipline. It is now being conducted calmly and with relative independence, in line with the central bank’s natural function as an institution responsible for liquidity management, inflation containment, safeguarding the soundness of the banking system, and designing policies suited to the country’s current circumstances.
Credit is due to the leadership of the Central Bank—headed by Ms Amina Mirghani—for producing a document written in clear, slogan-free language, focused on the core mandate and instruments of a central bank. This approach reflects a more precise understanding of the economic phase the country is undergoing and an effort to entrench disciplined professional practice appropriate to a complex reality that requires realistic, implementable policies.
The document places particular emphasis on supporting productive sectors in general, recognising them as the true foundation for increasing market supply and achieving monetary stability. This orientation encompasses various productive activities, including agriculture and industry, and is consistent with the role of monetary policy, which sets a supportive framework while leaving implementation details to fiscal policy and the relevant authorities. However, the practical impact of this support remains contingent on the extent to which the surrounding production environment is properly prepared, particularly with regard to fees and procedural costs.
With respect to exports, the policies focus on encouraging exports and regulating export proceeds as a key source of foreign currency, by directing the banking system to support this activity. Exporters, however, face implementation challenges arising from the multiplicity of fees and differing procedures across states, which raise the cost of Sudanese goods and weaken their competitiveness in external markets. In this context, the problem does not lie in monetary policy itself, but in the lack of coordination with the bodies that effectively determine production and export costs.
For example, the cost of a tonne of groundnuts delivered to Port Sudan exceeds USD 1,300, while the global price does not exceed USD 950. This places Sudan at a competitive disadvantage compared to countries such as Senegal and Chad, which—besides its own production—serves as a transit route for groundnuts from Nyala in West Darfur en route to Cameroon’s Douala port. The same applies to sesame, whose prices initially stabilised before rising rapidly, with the price per qintar in Gedaref exceeding SDG 160,000. As a result, the cost per tonne delivered to Port Sudan exceeds USD 1,200 after passing through a chain of fees and levies, while Brazilian sesame is offered at no more than USD 950 delivered to the destination port. The same dynamic applies to cotton, which faces stiff competition from Greek cotton. In such cases, it is not the central bank’s policy that fails, but rather that it is undermined by the absence of coordination with the authorities imposing these fees, foremost among them state governments.
The document also addresses the gold sector as an important source of foreign currency. It stresses the need to organise gold-related transactions within the formal banking framework, thereby maximising export proceeds and supporting monetary stability. This approach reflects a practical understanding of the Sudanese economy, where gold remains a key source of foreign exchange. However, achieving the full impact of this path remains dependent on reducing leakage outside official channels and integrating monetary measures with fiscal and regulatory policies.
Among the notable points in the document is the reference to financing reconstruction projects, particularly those related to essential services such as healthcare facilities and educational institutions, within the framework of supporting economic activity and restarting service infrastructure. The document also mentions solar panels and batteries in relation to imports, reflecting an interest in providing energy inputs necessary for economic activity under current challenges. This orientation aligns with the importance of electrifying agricultural projects—especially in the Northern and River Nile states—and providing energy alternatives that reduce production costs over the medium and long term.
Another important issue addressed in the policies concerns bank boards of directors, affirming that reform of the banking system cannot be complete without reforming those who make decisions within it. Reality shows that the difficulties faced by some banks were not due solely to a lack of finance, but also to weak governance and poor risk assessment by boards that failed to perform their role adequately. It is no longer convincing to place sole responsibility on executive management, as the board of directors approves policies and ultimately bears responsibility for them.
Similarly, the policy of merging distressed banks is a correct and necessary step, but it will not achieve its objectives unless accompanied by genuine reform of the boards of directors. Merging weak institutions without addressing the way they are managed simply transfers the problem from a smaller entity to a larger one.
In this context, attention is also drawn to companies owned by or affiliated with commercial banks, which represent one of the most prominent distortions of competition in the market. These entities operate as commercial businesses enjoying advantages not available to the private sector, drawing on the weight of their parent banks, easy access to finance, priority in banking transactions, availability of commercial information and market studies via clients, lower cost of capital than the market, and control over a significant share of deposits. This situation undermines the principle of a level playing field, transforms banks from financiers into direct commercial actors, opens the door to conflicts of interest, and weakens entrepreneurs’ role in driving genuine investment and productivity.
Regarding the management of monetary policy, the document clearly defines the central bank’s role by limiting its instruments to liquidity control, money supply regulation, inflation management, and safeguarding the soundness of the banking system, without assigning it responsibility for financing public expenditure. This delineation is correct in principle, but its effectiveness remains dependent on the existence of overall fiscal discipline that limits pressures which may spill over into the banking system in the absence of clear deficit ceilings—especially given the security and military conditions facing the country, which may make recourse to borrowing from the banking system more likely.
As for digital transformation and the reduction of cash transactions, these have proven practically successful and have become part of the daily behaviour of traders and citizens alike, facilitating transactions and enhancing the efficiency of the banking system. This path constitutes one of the strengths that can be built upon and further developed in the coming phase.
The real challenge facing these policies lies not in the soundness of their overall direction but in the reality of their implementation. The central bank sets the general framework and directs the banking system, while execution occurs in an environment where the mandates of multiple bodies overlap and fees, levies, and procedures proliferate—particularly at the state level. This is where the gap widens between what policies stipulate and what the economy actually encounters on the ground.
To ensure a transition from policy to effective implementation that achieves the intended objectives, there is an urgent need for serious institutional coordination between the central bank and the entities directly involved in on-the-ground implementation—foremost among them the Taxation Chamber, the Customs Authority, the Employers’ Federation, the Economic Security Authority, and state governments. Such coordination is not merely formal, but a fundamental condition for transforming sound monetary policy frameworks into tangible economic outcomes by unifying fees and procedures and reducing production and export costs.
In conclusion, the Central Bank of Sudan’s 2026 policies reflect a more disciplined professional orientation and a deeper understanding of the current economic phase. They encompass important pillars ranging from support for production, exports, and gold, to reconstruction and energy, as well as banking sector reform. However, the success of these policies remains contingent on the state’s ability to improve coordination among its institutions, narrow the gap between policy text and implementation, and build a more stable, gradual economic trajectory.

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