Sudan and the Challenges of Existence (3): Engineering Collapse – Sudan Between Chapter VII and the Manufacture of Alternative Forces

Salma Hamad
Introduction
In the previous two parts, we examined demographic change and the French role in pushing pastoral tribes in the Sahel region towards Sudan. In this part, we trace the legal and political trajectory of international intervention in Darfur as a decisive factor that cannot be overlooked in understanding the evolution of the Darfur crisis, its dynamics, and its extended impact leading to the war that Sudan is enduring today.
The Armed Forces: Between Constraints and International Oversight
The year 2004 did not merely mark the beginning of international intervention in Darfur; it opened the door to a series of interactions and transformations whose effects persist beyond the current war. From that point onwards, the international community moved beyond mediation and humanitarian assistance to become a direct actor reshaping the region’s legal, military, and demographic landscape. Through Security Council resolutions and forces deployed in partnership with the African Union, Sudan — represented by its armed forces — became subject to international restrictions, monitoring and accountability.
This article seeks to examine the facts objectively, analysing how international intervention contributed to complicating the Darfur crisis. The UN Security Council and the African Union played a direct role in encircling the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) with agreements, resolutions and oversight mechanisms that classified defensive movements as “security violations” subject to international scrutiny, thereby limiting military capacity in the face of insurgent movements. The surprise attack by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on Khartoum in 2008 exposed the extent to which these international constraints had curtailed the SAF’s ability to conduct reconnaissance, pre-emptive operations and redeployment within Darfur.
Despite the proliferation of resolutions and deployed forces, international intervention failed to achieve its stated objectives of dismantling rebel groups and disarming the Janjaweed. Instead, it reshaped the balance of power, weakening the national military institution and compelling it to adopt alternative security arrangements — ultimately paving the way for the emergence of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Similarly, international intervention did not facilitate the return of displaced Darfuris to their lands. Instead, it entrenched displacement through a policy of “Protection without Return”, effectively consolidating demographic change as generations grew up in camps while villages and traditional landholdings (hawakeer) fell into the hands of new settlers.
This raises a fundamental question: did international intervention truly combat the Janjaweed, or did pressure placed on the Sudanese Armed Forces indirectly enhance their power, legitimacy and regional connections?
The N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement – 2004
Signed on 8 April 2004 between the Government of Sudan and rebel movements (JEM and the Sudan Liberation Movement) under African Union auspices, the agreement established the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to monitor the ceasefire. It imposed strict limitations on SAF movements and placed them under AU supervision.
UN Security Council Resolution 1591 – Sanctions and Air Restrictions
On 29 March 2005, Resolution 1591 escalated intervention from mediation to sanctions and oversight. It imposed an arms embargo on Darfur and required prior notification and approval by the Sanctions Committee for any weapons or ammunition entering the region.
Although theoretically applicable to all parties, in practice the SAF was the primary entity subject to scrutiny. Restrictions on military flights significantly undermined the army’s air superiority against insurgents. Later, UNAMID was mandated to monitor violations.
The Abuja Agreement 2006 – Buffer Zones and Further Constraints
The Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja, 5 May 2006) introduced additional constraints, including provisions for the integration of forces and the disarmament of militias. It created buffer zones around displacement camps, prohibiting SAF entry, and required prior notification and adherence to agreed timelines for redeployment — particularly away from contact zones with rebel movements. Any uncoordinated movement risked being classified as a direct breach.
UNAMID – Chapter VII Mandate and Expanded Oversight
These pressures culminated in Security Council Resolution 1769 (31 July 2007), establishing the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), comprising nearly 26,000 personnel — then the largest peacekeeping force authorised by the Council.
Operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (authorising the use of force), Darfur was officially designated a threat to international peace and security. UNAMID was tasked with verifying military activity across Darfur, rendering all SAF movements — whether redeployments, pre-emptive operations, or the recovery of villages — subject to international classification as potential breaches of international agreements.
Thus, the SAF found itself effectively constrained in managing operations within a region facing armed rebellion, while Sudan was subjected to sustained political pressure and periodic international condemnation, with routine military activities debated in the Security Council.
Despite its size and mandate, UNAMID largely confined its practical role to protecting civilians within camps and securing humanitarian aid corridors, without actively facilitating resettlement or ensuring protection in non-displaced communities.
International Intervention: A Prelude to War
Reviewing this sequence of decisions suggests that the legal and international framework was structured to achieve several outcomes:
– Transforming UNAMID’s periodic reports into instruments of political pressure within the Security Council, criminalising SAF actions as treaty violations.
– Restricting army mobility, thereby enabling rebel expansion under the shield of international oversight.
– Converting buffer zones into areas effectively beyond state authority.
It is important to note that no explicit provision formally prohibited SAF deployment in Darfur. Rather, the cumulative political and legal environment created a de facto prohibition: any unauthorised movement risked triggering expanded international intervention.
The RSF – A Product of the International Environment?
This leads to a final and provocative question: was the state effectively driven to establish alternative forces capable of confronting insurgents outside the constraints imposed upon the national army? Particularly given that the international community and the Security Council appeared comparatively flexible in their engagement with the RSF, which later gained practical legitimacy through cooperation with the European Union and regional actors.
To be continued…

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