Sudan and Saudi Arabia: Partnership or Subordination?

Dr Al-Haytham Al-Kindi Yusuf
In the world of politics, there are no permanent friendships—only shared interests. Yet, given the ties of kinship and geography between Sudan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, those interests ought to transcend calculations of profit and loss and instead reflect a notion of shared destiny—or at least, that is how it should be.
With the continuation of what is termed the “War of Dignity”, legitimate questions arise regarding the nature of this relationship: is it a genuine strategic partnership, or an attempt at political subordination?
The convergence of interests and the confrontation of a common adversary have made Saudi Arabia one of the principal supporters of the Sudanese state in the face of the regional scheme that erupted on 15 April 2023. However, this support must be read in its proper context. The Kingdom did not act out of sentiment alone, but because it recognised that a conflagration in Sudan would not spare it. Indeed, it has become clear that the same scheme targeting Sudan is akin to that which once sought to besiege Saudi Arabia, disrupt its domestic development agenda, and weaken its regional role. The adversary is one, and the destinies are intertwined.
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia’s apparent attempts to engineer Sudan’s internal political landscape—whether by delineating the boundaries of certain domestic actors, the reported hesitation in financing a Pakistani arms deal that might have significantly shifted the balance of the war in favour of the Sudanese Armed Forces, or the alleged obstruction and prolonged detention of Sudanese supply vessels in Saudi ports—raise legitimate questions about the Kingdom’s vision of this relationship. Such developments render the question posed in this article both logical and necessary.
The Kingdom is well aware that the narratives propagated by Sudan’s adversaries to stir its concerns are unfounded. It therefore falls upon Sudanese diplomacy to address these apprehensions, making clear that no political faction in Sudan controls the army’s decisions or poses a threat to Saudi interests, and that the Sudanese state does not endorse Iran’s attacks on Gulf countries.
Sudan must also reaffirm that weakening the Sudanese state or attempting to constrain its strategic autonomy does not serve Saudi security; rather, it inadvertently advances regional expansionist projects seeking to turn Sudan into a dagger pointed at Saudi Arabia’s western flank—much as was attempted in Yemen.
At present, the Red Sea represents a vital artery for the Kingdom, especially following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz amid Gulf tensions. It has become a crucial alternative route for Saudi oil exports, as well as a primary channel for its imports. A strong Sudanese state, firmly in control of its territory and coastline, ensures the security of the opposite shore and prevents Sudanese ports from becoming launch points for threats to international navigation.
Saudi Arabia must therefore recognise that Sudan’s stability is not merely a diplomatic option for Riyadh—it is a strategic necessity for safeguarding the Kingdom’s lifeline.
It is worth noting that the prospects for cooperation extend beyond geopolitics into the more decisive economic dimension. Saudi Arabia imports nearly 80% of its food requirements. In 2024 alone, these imports exceeded $10.8 billion, sourced from Brazil (meat and poultry), India and Pakistan (rice), and Russia and Ukraine (grain).
The war in Ukraine and tensions in the Gulf have disrupted supply chains and driven maritime shipping and insurance costs up by as much as 30%, making reliance on Sudan—located just a short distance from the port of Jeddah—an indispensable option.
As early as the 2007 Arab Summit in Riyadh, the economist Professor Al-Kindi Yusuf presented comprehensive proposals for utilising Sudan’s agricultural, mineral, and petroleum resources through Saudi financing. The time has come to take these proposals off the shelves and translate them into actionable programmes of cooperation in:
Agriculture and agro-industry, including livestock production, in ways that benefit both countries. Saudi Arabia would secure a nearby, cost-effective supply, reducing vulnerability to disruptions in global shipping, while Sudan would activate its resources, create employment, and strengthen its export balance.
Mining investment, particularly in the resource-rich joint zone in the Red Sea bed, as well as gold-producing regions in northern and western Sudan.
Oil and gas extraction, given studies confirming economically viable reserves across several regions of Sudan.
Port development, transforming them into global logistics hubs serving both nations.
At the same time, Sudan would be well advised not to place all its eggs in one basket. Should tactical hesitation persist on Riyadh’s part, Sudan retains viable and robust international options with powers such as Russia and China—not only as military partners, but also as economic collaborators in agriculture, gold, and energy sectors. Signalling these alternatives is not mere manoeuvring; it is an assertion of Sudan’s sovereign decision-making and a shift from a paradigm of dependency to one of equal partnership.
Ultimately, Sudan’s stability constitutes a safety valve against regional chaos that would spare no one. What is needed is a balanced relationship in which Sudan serves as the Kingdom’s food basket, and Saudi Arabia provides strategic depth for Sudan—within a genuine partnership commensurate with the scale of the challenges facing both nations.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=12404