Sudan and OPCW… What Needs to Be Done?

Ambassador Mohamed El Hassan Ibrahim
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is a specialised international organisation. It was established in 1993 when the number of signatory states to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—which bans the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons—reached the threshold for entry into force. The OPCW is headquartered in The Hague, and the number of states that have signed and acceded to the Convention now stands at 193.
Sudan acceded to the Convention on May 16, 1999, and it entered into force a month later, in accordance with the Convention’s accession procedures. Before Sudan’s accession, it had requested that the OPCW investigate claims of chemical weapons production at the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory. However, the organisation declined at the time, as Sudan was not a party to the Convention, and such investigations are only conducted if the state is a party. Sudan had nonetheless provided information about these weapons as part of its national obligations.
When examining the reasons behind Sudan’s delayed accession to the Convention, we encountered a paradox that deprived the country of significant benefits it could have obtained. The only justification was that a fellow Arab state had refrained from joining for its own reasons, but it was portrayed as a collective Arab decision not to accede. The late Ambassador Fath El Arwa, then Sudan’s Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, played a pivotal role in convincing the leadership to join. He submitted the request, which was then followed up by the embassy in The Hague.
Since joining the OPCW, Sudan has been an active member of the African Group. It chaired the group’s first meeting and later became a member of the Executive Council, composed of 41 states distributed geographically. Sudan has maintained this membership and chaired the Council on three occasions.
In accordance with its commitments, Sudan submitted a comprehensive file demonstrating that the country is free of chemical weapons. Sudan also benefited from its membership by training military and civil defense personnel, as well as technical experts in the field. More than 200 individuals may have obtained certified training as a result.
Regarding the recent U.S. accusation against Sudan’s armed forces for allegedly using chemical weapons last year, the initial report came via a tweet from a journalist on platform X, followed by an article published on January 16 of this year. The U.S. administration relied on this report to make the accusation that Sudanese forces had used chemical weapons at some point in the previous year!
It’s important to recall that the U.S. has a long history of making such accusations against Arab countries—including Iraq, Syria, and Sudan. It used these accusations to justify actions such as bombing the Al-Shifa factory in Khartoum North and later launching the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
This unsupported accusation was imposed under the U.S. Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Elimination Act of 1991. Notably, the U.S. did not notify the OPCW of this accusation, nor did it share any of its purported evidence. This clearly shows that the accusation lacks a legal basis. The OPCW is the authority responsible for verifying such claims, and the Convention devotes an entire chapter to detailed procedures for handling accusations—down to hourly timelines—starting with notifying the accused state and other parties, forming a technical inspection team, and conducting inspections with rigorous technical and legal guarantees provided by the OPCW.
All these procedures are laid out in Part XI of the Convention, which governs investigations conducted by the Technical Secretariat and includes:
Notification from a state alleging that another party has used chemical weapons on its territory or elsewhere
Appointment of the inspection team
Deployment of the team
Briefing sessions
Conduct of inspections
Access
Sampling
Interviews
Reporting
It is precisely these detailed procedures that the U.S. chose to ignore when making its accusation and imposing sanctions.
Did Sudan Miss an Opportunity to Refute the Accusation?
From the moment the journalistic reports surfaced, we alerted the relevant authorities about the need to take the accusation seriously, respond objectively to the article, inform the OPCW, and engage with the United States. Sudan has had extensive experience with such matters—from the bombing of the Al-Shifa factory to numerous past accusations by the U.S. since Sudan joined the Convention and during the protracted Darfur conflict. Constructive engagement in the past had acted as a shield against the escalation of such allegations, preventing them from resulting in public conclusions or sanctions.
People may wonder why the U.S. would issue an accusation and then unilaterally impose sanctions without referring the matter to the international organisation responsible for it. Sudan’s failure to respond in a timely manner and to communicate with the U.S.—as it had done in past years—can likely be attributed to the country’s preoccupation with repelling aggression by a regionally backed terrorist militia. The U.S. took advantage of this distraction to impose sanctions under its domestic law, knowing that the Convention provides room for parties to resolve disputes among themselves, as stipulated in Article 9.1, which states:
“Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other directly or through the Organization, or by other international procedures, including procedures within the framework of the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the object and purpose of this Convention or the implementation of its provisions.”
Article 19
We mention this article due to its importance in understanding the basis on which the U.S. accused Sudan’s armed forces and imposed economic sanctions. This fits within the broader context of a longstanding U.S. policy of targeting Sudan across successive governments—an approach that appears premeditated and simply awaiting an opportunity to reimpose economic isolation and harsh sanctions, all while maintaining diplomatic relations as if nothing had happened. This conduct further tarnishes the already declining global reputation of the United States.
Does Sudan Still Have a Chance to Appeal to the OPCW?
Now that we have missed the chance to engage the U.S. constructively—as we had done in the past to rebut accusations—and sanctions have been imposed, there remains another route we could pursue. However, it is not without its own challenges, such as the country’s readiness to allow inspections in locations unknown to us, as the accusation was vague in specifying the place and time of the alleged use of chemical weapons. The geographical scope was not defined, nor was the time frame, and the competent authority may currently be preoccupied with the daily realities of war. The national committee may also have been affected by interference from the militia, as many institutions have been.
The required procedure is for Sudan to request clarification from the United States through the OPCW Executive Council. Such requests are treated urgently. The Council would then ask the Director-General to forward the request immediately to the relevant state, which must respond within 24 hours of receipt. The responding state is obligated to reply within no more than ten days.
If the response is not satisfactory, the requesting state may ask for a meeting of the Executive Council and may also request to brief non-member states of the Council. It may even call for a Council session if the response is deemed inadequate.
If the reply still falls short, the requesting state can demand a “challenge inspection.” Sudan may invoke Article 9(2) of the Convention, which provides for such inspections of any facility or site to verify compliance, as outlined in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Article 9.
We must not accept defeat or resign ourselves to the imposition of sanctions—especially given the cavalier way in which the United States handled this matter. The accusation was neither explicit nor detailed. Even the official statement failed to specify any particular incident, time, or location. And yet, sanctions are being imposed.
Let us raise this issue in its proper technical forums, in the media, and among Sudan’s friends and the international community at large.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=5734