Protecting Civilians in War—or Waging War on Civilians?

Dr Inas Mohamed Ahmed
Historically, the story of establishing conventions to protect civilians in war is one of international responses to painful humanitarian catastrophes and tragedies. The need evolved from mere humanitarian customs to recommendations adopted by international conferences, and ultimately to binding international treaties for the protection of civilians—forming, in time, the cornerstone of international humanitarian law.

The beginning came in 1864 with the signing of the Geneva Convention for the protection of the wounded and sick on the battlefield, though it did not adequately cover civilians. This was followed by the 1929 Diplomatic Conference to revise the conventions, which recommended reviewing and studying agreements on the protection of prisoners of war and drafting a convention for the protection of civilians—an endeavour that was not completed.

In 1934, the International Committee of the Red Cross prepared the so-called “Tokyo Draft” for the protection of civilians, consisting of 33 articles, intended for submission to a diplomatic conference scheduled for 1940. That conference, however, was postponed due to the outbreak of the Second World War.

After the Second World War—with all the bitterness and suffering it left behind—a diplomatic conference was convened in Geneva in 1949 to establish international conventions for the protection of war victims. This resulted in the four conventions known as the Geneva Conventions, foremost among them the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, which focused on the protection of civilians. Additional Protocols were later adopted (in 1977 and 2005) to expand the scope of protection. These conventions do not contradict the provisions of the 1907 Hague Regulations concerning the same protections; rather, they complement and reaffirm them, as stated in Article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Applying the above to the war in Sudan, its repercussions clearly demonstrate regional and global effects. The intersecting interests of major powers have played an active role in prolonging the conflict, while the sequence of events warns of a global disorder that could transcend the political, economic, and humanitarian dimensions anticipated by experts. Sudan today harbours the world’s most severe humanitarian crisis—despite the secrecy surrounding it, the media’s downplaying of its gravity, and attempts to soften its perceived impact.

Meanwhile, attacks by the rebel militia using (Emirati) drones have intensified, targeting safe cities and civilians. A drone launched by the militia of death and destruction struck a house in the city of El Obeid, killing ten people, including children no older than four. River Nile State was also attacked by seven suicide drones launched against civilians, killing one person and injuring others. The army managed to shoot down approximately nine additional drones that were en route to target innocent lives and civilian infrastructure, as well as ten suicide drones in the desert area of Ad-Damir stretching from Atbara Cement Factories in the north to the Al-Zidab area in the south, before they reached their targets.

On 5 January, the 19th Infantry Division in Merowe stated in a communiqué that air defences had intercepted suicide drones launched by the terrorist militia targeting its headquarters, Merowe Air Base, and the Merowe Dam—attacks forming part of a broader campaign against strategic installations.

Earlier, the militia targeted the electricity station in El Obeid, North Kordofan State, and Kenana Airport in White Nile State. All of these are civilian objects, and attacks against them constitute war crimes.

The use of drones has raised the humanitarian cost of the war, with a sharp increase in civilian deaths and the systematic, deliberate destruction of civilian objects. These are neither isolated incidents nor military errors; they are planned targets and intentional, systematic attacks against civilians.

The United Nations, through its Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), has expressed concern over drone airstrikes on civilians. That, it seems, is the extent of its response: the expression of “concern”.

On a related front, the “No to the Oppression of Women” initiative revealed that 600 women are being held in “Korea Prison” in Nyala, South Darfur State, where they are subjected to torture and sexual violence, leading to severe deterioration in their health, alongside food shortages and lack of medical care. Their children are also detained in harsh conditions, deprived of adequate food and healthcare, with most suffering from malnutrition and disease. Amnesty International has held the militia responsible for the safety of the detained women and children. Given that the militia neither abides by laws nor respects customs, conventions, or treaties, the situation of these women and children is extremely dangerous and catastrophic—while the world remains silent.

On the battlefield, despite the erosion of the militia’s capabilities and the limitation of its movements, its use of drones to impose continuous pressure on the armed forces has failed. The decisive tactics of the armed forces and their focus on completing their strategic objectives have placed the militia between the hammer of continuous attrition and the anvil of losing balance on the battlefield—resulting in an ongoing series of undeclared defeats.

On the humanitarian front, waves of displacement continue whenever fighting intensifies, exacerbating the humanitarian situation and increasing the need for aid and medical care for civilians. With the militia’s continued targeting of civilians and civilian objects, international and regional relief organisations have raised their warning levels regarding further deterioration of the humanitarian situation—yet the world’s silence remains shameful.

Amid these painful developments that have defined the Sudanese scene since the outbreak of war, regional blocs have emerged as factors sustaining the conflict and deepening the entanglement of regional and international powers. This weakens initiatives—both regional and international—to halt the war and worsens the humanitarian crisis.

Diplomatically, Cameron Hudson, the American diplomat and expert on African affairs, stated during a UN Security Council session on 22 December 2025: “More than 12 countries are supporting the Rapid Support Forces with weapons and equipment, yet they come here to this Council to speak about the deteriorating humanitarian situation. Yes, it has deteriorated—because of the weapons they sent.” The world listened—and remained silent.

At a time when the world is commemorating the 75th anniversary of the four Geneva Conventions—issued in August 1949, entering into force in October 1950, and ratified by more than 194 states, making them the most widely ratified international treaties and rendering their application obligatory worldwide—these conventions remain a strategic pillar of international humanitarian law. They codify the fundamental rules that limit the violence and brutality of war and oblige parties to respect and apply them. Yet despite all this, past and present experiences of wars around the world compel us to urgently reconsider how civilians are protected through effective international mechanisms, because what is occurring on the ground has gone far beyond what these conventions envisage.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=10288