My Commentary on Ambassador Obeid Murawih’s Article: “Sudan’s Earthquake… Are We Approaching the Formation of the Largest Bloc?”

Dr Khidir Haroun
* The importance of the article lies in its call to think outside the box. It has raised important issues that have long remained stagnant, not least the prolonged nature of the transitional period. In a brief message to Ambassador Murawih, I remarked that this transition is now approaching the combined duration of the two democratic periods that followed the fall of the Ibrahim Abboud and Jaafar Nimeiri regimes. The current transition has become almost open-ended, largely because geopolitics has, this time, overshadowed national decision-making. The relentless search for a government acceptable to the region and the wider international community—both heavily invested in Sudan—has rendered such a goal nearly unattainable, akin to the proverbial search for the cow of the Children of Israel.
* Those inclined towards suspicion may interpret this prolonged transition as a convenient means for those in power to remain within the circles of authority and visibility. Our political culture often rationalises delay under the guise of prudence—“haste is from the devil” and “there is blessing in stillness.”
* Many indeed hold such views, and they are entitled to do so. Yet the reality is more complex. Engaging in such a discussion with the necessary honesty and candour is fraught with accusations and suspicion, making withdrawal from public debate the safer course for many, even though silence serves no truth.
* I wish to stress that these remarks are made from a position of commitment to the unity of the Sudanese state and deep respect for the sacrifices made to preserve it. I honour the sacrifices of the armed forces and allied forces, as well as volunteers, and pray for their martyrs. My reflections are not rooted in any partisan, ideological, or political agenda, nor do they target individuals. All individuals deserve respect; the focus here is on institutions and how they ought to function, free from personal bias.
Sudan’s Crisis in Context
* Sudan is not unique among post-colonial states. Many nations that entered the modern state system share similar challenges of cultural, religious, and social diversity. Even in Africa, few states are fully homogeneous—Somalia, perhaps, being the closest —but it still suffers internal conflicts. In Asia, perhaps only Japan approximates such homogeneity.
Sudan’s diversity is not so extreme as to preclude stability. The colonial legacy is a shared burden among many nations and cannot alone explain our failures after more than seventy years of independence.
The Juba Agreement and the Missed Opportunity
* In relation to Ambassador Murawih’s article, I consider the Juba Peace Agreement to be the first major error that prolonged the transition. National reconciliation with armed movements was necessary and justified, given their legitimate demands for inclusion and justice.
However, the transition authorities—both civilian and military—failed to seize that historic moment to reset the political landscape. Instead of fostering inclusive dialogue, they pursued exclusion and political score-settling. Forces that had participated in the uprising were marginalised, while new alliances were formed on the basis of expediency rather than national vision.
The result was a replication of past models—drawing on the logic of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement—and even an echo of colonial “closed districts” policies that entrenched regional divisions rather than fostering unity.
This was a short-sighted approach. A more strategic vision prioritised national cohesion, inclusive governance, and a fresh start for all Sudanese under a shared national project.
Structural Imbalances and Their Consequences
* The creation of regions such as Darfur and Blue Nile as special administrative entities—while leaving other areas as ordinary states—generated new grievances. Regions like Al-Jazira, Northern Sudan, and the Red Sea felt excluded, contributing to unrest, including port closures that played a role in the collapse of the transitional government.
Today, Sudan is governed by multiple centres of authority. Regional leaders conduct foreign engagements despite the existence of a central government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This fragmentation weakens state authority and complicates governance.
* The multiplicity of military and civilian actors also creates operational confusion. While all forces have fought honourably in many instances, overlapping mandates hinder effective governance and security. Reports of criminal groups impersonating security forces, and continued infiltration by rebel elements—even in liberated areas—are deeply alarming.
The Question of the Future
* A critical question arises: will these temporary arrangements persist once a legitimate, elected state is established? Will some regions retain privileges while others remain ordinary states? I hope that the current regional arrangements are understood as transitional, pending elections.
A Proposal for a New Transitional Phase
* Has the time not come for this transition to end?
Let us think differently. Let us consider the current phase as “Transition A”—an open-ended necessity dictated by circumstances—and initiate a defined “Transition B” lasting, for example, two years, culminating in general elections.
* Previous elections in Sudan were partial, excluding conflict zones. Why not establish a national commission of civil servants and experts to prepare for comprehensive elections, beginning with a population census—even among displaced persons wherever they reside?
* Elections could be structured in a bottom-up manner—from villages to the national level—forming a representative national assembly that establishes a government in agreement with the army. Regional governments would also be formed accordingly.
* During this transitional phase, elections could be non-partisan, prioritising young men and women (with an upper age limit of fifty at the local level), based on their service during the war and displacement.
This arrangement would be temporary, leading to full national elections once stability is restored.
The Broader Implications
* Would this not restore public confidence that the country is moving in the right direction?
• Would it not signal that “transition” no longer means indefinite limbo?
• Would it not reassure the international community that Sudan is finally on a path towards stability, rather than remaining in a situation between the two?
I believe it would.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=12423