Haftar and Hemedti: “A Just Copy and Paste” Dude

by Rashid Abdel Rahim
There are many similarities between the rebel Libyan general Khalifa Haftar and the Sudanese rebel Hemedti.
Both were raised and nurtured in power, then turned against it. Haftar disavowed Gaddafi, just as Hemedti rebelled against Bashir. Both offered their rifles for sale to their country’s enemies.
Both sought the help of Arab tribes in Sudan and Chad: Hemedti with the Rizeigat and others, and Haftar with the leader of Chadian Arabs, Ahmed Agbash.
Both led armies whose weapons and equipment were sourced by other countries.
Haftar is a failed Libyan leader who was defeated in the war with Chad and failed to control his country’s capital, Tripoli. He fled to an alternative capital, similar to Hemedti.
Who is Khalifa Haftar?
He is a Libyan officer born in 1943 and graduated in 1966, then received a scholarship to the Soviet Union for three years, after which he obtained a training scholarship in Egypt. A Sudanese military commander who worked in security during the government of Swar al-Dahab and was a colleague of Haftar in some of his studies told me that he was known for the recklessness of youth obsessed by power and wealth. He participated with Colonel Gaddafi in the coup against the rule of king Senussi when he was 26 years old. The war with Chad broke out in 1986, and Haftar was then a Colonel and was thus a senior officer of Gaddafi’s military forces in Chad during the war.
He was defeated in the Chad war and held POW along with about 700 of his men who were captured after their defeat in the air raid on the Ouadi Doum.
Gaddafi had opted during the Chad war to seek the help of the Arab Muslim tribes and communicated with their leader, Asil Ahmed Agbash, the commander in the opposition Frolina Front, who later founded the faction of the Democratic Revolutionary Council, and was also the foreign minister in Chad.
After that, Asil concluded an agreement with then Chadian president, Goukouni Waday, whom Gaddafi considered his enemy number one, and thus the alliance between Gaddafi and Asil collapsed. But Asil did not hold his position long as he was killed in a helicopter crash on 19/7/1983 in the city of (Lai Tofi), which Chad considered a planned and a premeditated operation by Gaddafi. Gaddafi dumped his defeated army commander and denied the existence of his forces in Chad. Contacts were established between the leadership of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, which was opposed to Gaddafi, and Haftar, resulting in his being absorbed among them. The front tasked him with leading its military wing, which it established with the support of the US Central Intelligence Agency. Haftar remained in command of the front’s forces, which continued to train in Chad, benefiting from the enmity of Hussein Habré’s regime toward Gaddafi’s regime. In 1990, Habré was overthrown by Idriss Déby, and the Libyan National Army was dismantled.
Haftar and a large number of his forces were transported on American planes to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire at that time) and then to the United States.
He settled in the city of Langley, northern Virginia, near the headquarters of the CIA, and lived there for nearly two decades, obtaining U.S. citizenship. In 2014, Haftar established his forces called the (Libyan National Army), which entered the war after Gaddafi’s death and failed to control the capital, Tripoli, and eastern Libya. Haftar sought assistance from rebel forces everywhere, even from amongst those opposing his publicly declared policies, leftist Nasserist beliefs. This was clear in his current alliance with the extremist religious forces of (Paths of Peace) led by Syrian rebel Al-Kilani.
Haftar did not cease supporting the Rapid Support Forces, continuously supplying them with equipment, weapons, fuel, and fighters. This alliance persisted until his current participation with the rebel forces in attacking the border triangle between Egypt, Sudan, and Libya.
Haftar’s alliance with the Rapid Support Forces and their recent attacks would never be able to defeat the Sudanese army. The Rapid Support Forces are entering a losing bet with Haftar’s forces, as the rebels had significantly larger forces before the war and at its beginning than Haftar’s forces that he is relying on now, and their combined forces will not halt the progress of the armed forces nor prevent the Rapid Support Forces from facing a total defeat.

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