*Government of Hope: What Are Its Grand Strategic Tasks? (1-2)

By Dr. Al-Dirdiri Mohamed Ahmed

Who among us does not remember the meeting between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House on the last day of February this year? That meeting remains etched in memory because it was a live negotiation between the president of the world’s most powerful country and the leader of a European state subjected to brutal aggression. This aggression compelled the United States to spend nearly $300 billion to try to repel it, and forced Europe to contribute almost $200 billion. But more importantly, the meeting marked a pivotal moment in the contemporary history of international relations. It became clear afterwards that the cornerstone of today’s global order was no longer “prevention of aggression”—as enshrined in Article 4(2) of the UN Charter and interpreted by General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974)—but rather, “having the cards”. Since that historic meeting, no head of state or government in today’s world operates without relentlessly seeking to acquire “cards”.
And acquiring cards for Sudan must be the primary concern of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister Dr. Kamal Idris, and their government-in-formation. Sudan currently holds no cards. This first instalment of the two-part article will focus on the significance of “cards” in today’s world and how to acquire them.
During that meeting, Trump told Zelensky: “You are not in a good position. You don’t have the cards right now. With us, you will start to have the cards.” When Zelensky replied, “I don’t play with cards,” Trump responded firmly: “You do play with cards… your country is in big trouble. You won’t win this. You have a slim chance of survival—thanks to us only.” He concluded: “It is going to be hard to do business like this.”
Before Trump took office in January 2016, the international order—established after the Cold War—was based on respect for international law and shared global values. International politics operated under what was known as a rules-based order, which emphasised international law, strengthened multilateral cooperation and its institutions (such as the UN and the WTO), and upheld democracy and human rights as universal references. Thus, the 1990s and early 2000s were an era when legal norms, values, and institutions replaced brute force as the foundation of global affairs.
Significant theoretical contributions from renowned thinkers underpinned this. Francis Fukuyama wrote The End of History (1992), predicting the triumph of liberal democracy. Joseph Nye developed the concept of soft power and stressed the importance of multilateral diplomacy. Anne-Marie Slaughter advocated for a liberal international order built on transnational networks of governance. John Ikenberry argued at length that the United States should lead the global order because only it could build a system based on rules.
But after Trump came to power with his “America First” doctrine, the US abandoned that normative framework. National dominance took precedence over international cooperation. Traditional alliances—even NATO—were questioned unless they yielded direct material benefits. A new foreign policy approach emerged, rooted in transactionalism. Power and interests trumped legal norms.
Zelensky, therefore, could not expect White House support just because Russia violated international law; he had to play cards.
America’s new approach opened the floodgates for others—especially Russia, China, India, Brazil, Israel, and Turkey—to adopt similar strategies. Their strongman leaders—Putin, Xi Jinping, Modi, Bolsonaro (who may well return, as Trump has), Netanyahu, and Erdoğan—gained influence. Realist thinkers like John Mearsheimer gained prominence, arguing that great powers act on interests, not values. Older realist works also resurfaced—Barry Posen (2014), who called for US strategic restraint, and classic texts by Randall Schweller (1998) and Kenneth Waltz (1979).
The result: a global order driven by interests, not principles. Human rights cooperation collapsed. The US and other major powers no longer prioritise them. Trump didn’t care about Khashoggi’s murder; instead, he praised Mohammed bin Salman. The US withdrew from key international agreements and institutions: the Human Rights Council, the Paris Climate Accord, the WHO, and the Iran nuclear deal. Its solution to the Middle East was the Abraham Accords—essentially transactional deals normalising Arab–Israeli relations, with no concern for Palestinian rights.
The new American foreign policy focused on “strong allies” like MBS, MBZ, and Netanyahu. Alarm bells rang. Angela Merkel said in 2019: “The old certainties of the post-war order no longer apply.” Gideon Rachman described the new world order as “strongmen versus rules” in the Financial Times. The Economist repeatedly characterised the post-Trump international system as “geopolitical thuggery” (2018–2023).
Thus, Sudan’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister must prepare for the possibility that they too might sit across from Trump again in the White House—on Zelensky’s very chair. They must not then find themselves empty-handed, lacking any “cards.”
Sudan is no exception. Every effective nation around us has developed its own “cards”, nurtures them, and plays them at the right moment.
Egypt’s most important card is its enduring peace with Israel. It also leverages the Suez Canal, through which 12% of global trade passes—a geographic asset turned geopolitical card through diplomatic investment. Egypt has cultural, media, and religious influence—Al-Azhar being its crown jewel—and a large economic market.
Saudi Arabia’s key card is its oil production—second only to the US—with 10 million barrels a year. It has used this to lead OPEC and also draws religious weight as custodian of the holy sites. It actively engages regionally, as seen in Yemen, its reconciliation with Iran, and the Jeddah platform for Sudan. Its media arms (Al-Arabiya, Al-Hadath) support its regional narrative.
The UAE’s main card is its open hostility to Islamists and to traditional values in general. It plays active roles in proxy wars (Yemen, Libya, Syria, Sudan) and sees itself as a “Sparta” of the MENA region. It strategically uses its location at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz (20% of global oil/gas flows) and maintains ties with both East (China, Russia) and West. It has significant investments in media, tech, and space.
Qatar’s foremost card is the Al Udeid airbase—the largest in the Middle East, a linchpin of Western security in the region. It used this card deftly to defuse recent tensions between the U.S., Israel, and Iran. Qatar is the world’s top LNG exporter and leveraged this by signing long-term contracts with European countries after the Ukraine war. Diplomatically, it brands itself as the “Switzerland” of the region, actively mediating in conflicts across Gaza, Afghanistan, Congo–Rwanda, Lebanon, Libya, Chad—and Sudan. It maintains strategic independence from Gulf consensus and hosts Al Jazeera, a media titan shaping global discourse, particularly on Palestine.
Let no one think that acquiring “cards” is only for the powerful. Every country can develop cards—if it understands its assets and knows how to use them.
Look at Rwanda, and reflect on how it dealt with its greatest tragedy – the genocide of the Tutsis – and turned that experience into a rare success story in overcoming division and ethnic cleansing. Indeed, it presented itself to the world as a peacebuilder, and on that basis succeeded in forging strong, balanced and distinguished relations with France, the United Kingdom, China, Israel, and the Gulf states. It positioned itself as a messenger of peace. Today, its troops are involved in peacekeeping missions in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. They were also with us here in Sudan as part of UNAMID.
Then it turned its attention to its small capital, Kigali, with a population of no more than one and a half million, and transformed it into a model of what is known as a ‘smart city’ and an innovation hub.
Look also at Ethiopia, and how it insisted, with remarkable resolve, on building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), in order to harness its natural advantage as the source of this mighty river. In doing so, it secured a say that cannot be ignored in water diplomacy – one of the region’s most sensitive issues. It placed this achievement at the centre of a select portfolio of other “cards” afforded to it by its geographical and demographic advantages and its diplomatic weight as host of the African Union.
Uganda, for its part, chose a very peculiar but highly effective card: it made its capital a hub for intelligence cooperation with Europe, the United States, and Israel. Thanks to this card, Uganda has managed to act freely and unmonitored in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Somalia, and elsewhere. It has also positioned itself as a destination for asylum seekers from across the continent – including, more recently, Sudanese – even though few would ever have imagined Kampala or Gulu becoming a haven.
As for Kenya, in addition to its traditional cards – such as hosting peace mediations since the Machakos days and before, participating in peacekeeping missions from Africa to Haiti, and its wildlife preservation and safari tourism – it has added the card of model African democracy with regular elections, the card of a free press, and the card of technical cooperation, earning it the title of “Silicon Savannah”.
Sudan, too, tried to play its own cards. One of the results of Sudan’s successful mediation in South Sudan in 2018 was a strengthening of its negotiating position in discussions on lifting US sanctions. I remember well how Nikki Haley, then the US Ambassador to the UN, welcomed me and Sudan’s Permanent Representative, Ambassador Omer Dahab, to her office in September 2018 with the words: “Welcome, peacemakers.”
Likewise, Sudan’s successful mediation in the Central African Republic in February 2019 – a role it wrested from the clutches of France and the grip of Wagner – had a direct effect. It prompted France to consider supporting the African Union’s request to defer President al-Bashir’s indictment for a year under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, to allow him time to plan a smooth political transition. It also paved the way for negotiations between Sudan and France on a host of sensitive diplomatic and intelligence matters, some of which had been driven by France’s overt and covert influence. This included Sudan assuming leadership roles it rightfully deserved within the African Union, and the expulsion of Abdel Wahid al-Nur, who had been directing his military operations in Jebel Marra while sipping café crème in Parisian cafés.
Ambassador Dafallah al-Haj Ali – then our envoy to Paris – may well remember how French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian received us on a chilly day with a guard of honour in the courtyard of the Quai d’Orsay, and sat with us for two hours. The following day, we met with President Macron’s advisor on African affairs, his close friend Frank Paris – known as Monsieur Afrique. We later followed that with an informal meeting away from prying eyes.
These initiatives were part of Sudan’s effort to play its own “card” by positioning itself as a regional mediation power. Had time allowed, Sudan was on track to mediate between Uganda and Rwanda, having already cultivated strong relations with both presidents. They had in fact been approached and accepted Sudan’s mediation. There were also intentions to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea, once a temporary strain in Sudan–Eritrea relations had passed.
To reinforce this “card”, practical steps were taken to establish a College of Diplomatic Studies with a regional focus that would provide research backing for mediation efforts. Ambassador Omer Siddig – who has since become Minister of State, and whom we warmly congratulate – was tasked with this initiative. Professor Ahmed Suleiman, then Vice Chancellor of the University of Khartoum, supported the idea and secured its approval from the university senate. It also gained the support of Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, who pledged to fund the model building, since the college would host both Arab and African students.
All this effort was aimed at creating just one card – but one with meaning and long-term consequences. It would have improved Sudan’s international image, led to the inclusion of Sudanese troops in peacekeeping missions, and secured Sudanese seats in international and regional organisations.
But alas… events took a different turn.
If Sudan’s experiment in card-making began with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this process is by no means exclusive to that ministry. I am convinced there have been similar attempts – some of which may have succeeded or are on the verge of success – within the Ministries of Defence, Finance, Energy, Information, Culture, and others that may one day be revived or renewed.
This, then, is what can be said of the first major task facing the Government of Hope: forging strategic “cards” of influence.
In the next instalment of this article, we shall turn to two further strategic missions awaiting Dr. Kamal Idris and his government.

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