From the Illusion of Axes to the Moment of the State: Saudi Arabia and Egypt Lead the Middle East Beyond the Militia Era

Mohannad Awad Mahmoud
Militias in 2025 are no longer what they were when the wave of conflicts erupted after 2011—neither in function nor in their place within regional and international calculations. In the early years, they were treated as low-cost, temporary tools: used to fill state vacuums, rebalance existing powers, or impose rapid faits accomplis without direct state involvement. The prevailing assumption was that these formations could be employed briefly, then contained or dismantled later.

Practical experience over more than a decade has overturned this assumption. Militias did not remain pliable instruments; they evolved into independent actors possessing weapons, resources, and financing networks, imposing their own agendas on the very states that allowed their emergence or bet on them. What was presented as a temporary solution became a permanent problem; what was deemed a lever of influence turned into a burden threatening the state, its unity, and its stability.

More dangerously still, the very concept of “proxyhood” has changed. In the post-2011 phase, militias were remotely managed and operated within defined ceilings. Subsequently, however, militias came to administer territories, control sovereign resources, negotiate on behalf of regions and populations, and drag sponsoring states into miscalculated conflicts. In many cases, the state no longer uses the militia; the militia extorts the state—or replaces it.

In this context, the Middle Eastern conflict after 2011 was not a direct confrontation between sovereign states deploying their armies and centralised decisions, as politically and media-wise portrayed. Rather, it was a conflict managed through non-state tools—militias and proxies operating within Arab states—while the full cost of conflict was transferred to those states and societies. Sponsoring capitals managed the balance from afar; Arab capitals paid the price in security, economy, and social cohesion.

This is no longer theoretical. The Houthi movement today negotiates as a de facto authority controlling Sana’a and millions of people, speaking on salaries, ports, and airports in the name of “residents of areas under its control.” In Lebanon, Hezbollah frames decisive choices as defence of “the South” and “the suburbs,” claiming protection of its social base while bypassing state institutions. In Iraq, armed factions present themselves as representatives of entire provinces under banners of security and local particularity. In Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces followed the same path: moving beyond military action to present their war as a struggle for democracy, speaking in the name of Sudanese people, then announcing a parallel government in Darfur—an unmistakable shift from an armed force within the state to an actor claiming political representation and negotiating authority.

Alignments in that phase were clear: one axis built influence through irregular weapons and transnational militias; another countered with similar tools by backing local armed rivals; a third accepted managing chaos rather than resolving it. The aim was not to build stable states, but to regulate conflict—preventing decisive outcomes and postponing comprehensive collapse.

Iran represents the most complete model of the cost of this approach. Its regional influence was constructed through a network of armed arms stretching from Lebanon to Yemen via Iraq and Syria. This network delivered wide influence, but turned theatres of influence into arenas of permanent attrition. Iraq offers a stark example: despite the defeat of ISIS in 2017, the country did not become a model of stability; instead, it became weighed down by parallel arms, political paralysis, and accumulating popular anger.

Yemen became another testing ground. The conflict there expanded beyond the recognised government versus the Houthis to internal fractures within the anti-Houthi camp itself. The Southern Transitional Council fought under the Saudi-led coalition umbrella against the Houthis—a military partnership imposed by the necessities of confronting a common enemy, not by convergence over Yemen’s state form or future. When Riyadh asked the Council to withdraw and revert to the previous situation, this was not a tactical dispute but a reaffirmation that military coalitions cannot become cover for political projects that undermine the state.

Comparing Sudan with Iraq and Libya clarifies the picture. Libya lost the state and became a sovereignty-less arena of influence; Iraq retained the state formally but was exhausted by parallel weapons and entangled influence. Sudan now stands at the edge between the two models: either it decides as a state—or slides into an irreversible path.

Against these models, the Saudi role has emerged as a conscious attempt to recalibrate regional stability. With its global economic weight, advanced deterrent and military capabilities, wide political influence East and West, and its religious standing as the destination of the Islamic world, Saudi Arabia now sees the militia model as a threat not to specific states but to the entire region.

The Kingdom has articulated this shift clearly in official statements and declared positions, rejecting any support for armed formations outside the state framework and stressing that regional stability can only be built through national states and their legitimate institutions, with weapons confined to the state. This is no longer rhetorical; it is a fixed principle guiding policy and regional engagement, serving as a reference point in handling crises and conflicts.

Nor is this shift uniquely Saudi. It converges with changes in the positions of Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar. Here, Egypt’s stance stands out as foundational, preceding collective crystallisation. Egyptian policy towards Sudan has consistently limited engagement and support to the state and its legitimate institutions—foremost among them the armed forces—rejecting any path that confers political or military legitimacy on armed actors outside this framework. This has not been mere slogan-making; it has translated into practice in managing the Sudan file, reflecting a firm Egyptian conviction that regional stability is achieved not by balancing militias, but by supporting national armies and state institutions as the sole guarantors of unity and against fragmentation. Official language and statements across these states now clearly converge around the centrality of the national state, rejection of non-state armed actors, and emphasis on territorial unity and institutional legitimacy—confirming that the era of managing conflicts through militias has been exhausted.

Conclusion

The Middle East is entering a phase less tolerant of chaos and more stringent towards states that wager on militias. Saudi Arabia and Egypt—by virtue of their political, economic, and religious weight—stand at the forefront of this shift, restoring the state as the only legitimate actor.

For Sudan, the path is now clear: collect and unify weapons under state authority; end any parallel force arrangements; unify diplomatic messaging; and place sovereign resources firmly within state institutions. Taking these steps will not merely reintegrate Sudan into its regional environment; it will transform it from a managed case into a partner in the new regional formation. Those who delay this moment will pay a compounded price.

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