Chad: A Controversial Constitutional Amendment

By Ambassador Atta Al-Mannan Bakhit
On 3 October, the Chadian parliament, in its two chambers, held an important session that was boycotted by opposition minority MPs. The meeting adopted a significant amendment to the Chadian constitution, the most important of which was extending President Mahamat Déby’s term of office from five years to seven years, without limiting the number of presidential terms. This effectively allows the president to govern without a time restriction. One MP from the ruling majority even went as far as to propose that parliament declare President Déby president for life. Under the same amendment, the parliamentary term was also extended from five years to six.
The amendments will apply retroactively, meaning that President Déby’s current term, to which he was elected last year for five years, will now be extended to seven. The same rule will apply to members of parliament.
This amendment has sparked a wide-ranging legal controversy in Chad between supporters of the president—who consider it a technical measure within parliament’s remit—and the opposition, which sees it as the beginning of entrenching the Déby family’s rule indefinitely.
In this article, we present a brief overview of the positions of different Chadian political forces on the constitutional amendment and an analysis of the political implications for Chad.
It can be said that power fell into the hands of President Mahamat Déby not by design, but by circumstance. The sudden death of President Idriss Déby in April 2021 placed the country at a difficult crossroads. If Chad’s security situation had been calm at the time, as it is now, it is unlikely that Mahamat Déby would ever have come to power. This is because the 2005 constitution stipulated that, in the event of the president’s absence, the Speaker of Parliament would assume power for 60 days, after which general elections would be organised. But the security situation then was extremely delicate and threatened the very existence of the Chadian state. For this reason, military leaders, national elders, and Chad’s allies agreed to appoint Mahamat Déby as his father’s successor to manage a transitional period aimed at maintaining security and stability, after which presidential elections would be held.
The military council led by Déby junior succeeded in maintaining security and achieving a measure of stability, despite continuing challenges. But to do so, it suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament, and ruled under a transitional charter. In 2022, the military council opened a significant new chapter by engaging in dialogue with both armed and political opposition groups, in what became known as the Doha Dialogue. This important initiative convinced a large number of opposition figures, including armed groups, to return to the motherland. The Doha Dialogue paved the way for a broad national dialogue in the capital, N’Djamena, which came to be known as the Chadian National Dialogue.
One of the key outcomes of the national dialogue was the drafting of a new constitution, which was adopted in a referendum in 2023. This constitution allowed President Déby to run in the 2024 elections, in which he was elected as president. This, in short, is the political trajectory in Chad from the assassination of President Idriss Déby senior to the election of Déby junior.
Government supporters argue that the amendments adopted by parliament are merely technical. They point out that the 2023 constitution, approved by the Chadian people, contained a provision allowing amendments, and therefore—even if the amendment is important—it does not require another referendum. By contrast, other figures in parliament, such as Bahimi Badaki Albert, a veteran politician, former prime minister, and former parliamentary speaker, argue that parliament is not competent to pass a constitutional amendment of such depth. He stresses that Article 282 clearly stipulates that amendments of this nature must be carried out through a popular referendum. The broader opposition, for its part, considers this amendment a coup against the outcomes of the inclusive national dialogue, and a reversal of the Doha Dialogue.
Looking at the current political dynamics across Africa, Chad’s constitutional amendments run counter to prevailing winds. The model of a single family ruling a country has proven a failure and come to an end, as seen in Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Togo and elsewhere. Likewise, the system of single ruling parties claiming historical legitimacy has begun to crumble, as seen in South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, and previously in Senegal, Mali, Guinea, and others. Presidents who treated power as a hereditary right, as in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and the Congo, have placed their countries on the brink of explosive crises.
Extending the presidential term to seven years with no ceiling is likely to narrow the scope for participation and peaceful transfer of power. It will reinforce feelings of exclusion, frustration, and a drift towards violence—particularly in a country whose population is overwhelmingly young and yearning for change and renewal.
The seven-year presidential term is a French system, applied under the Fifth Republic. But even France itself came to recognise its shortcomings and amended it to a five-year term, renewable only once.
In conclusion, if the Chadian government believes that resolving the presidential term is necessary for implementing its programme to address Chad’s complex challenges, and it has used its parliamentary majority to achieve that, then the opposition—which is already fragmented—has no real leverage to reform or change the current political reality, which it regards as unacceptable.
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