Are There Any Reliable Friendships Between States in the International System?

Ambassador Abdel Azim Al-Sheikh Osman

From the leadership of our armed forces, we have learned the virtues of planning in silence, patience in the face of trials, and the restraint of anger—never reacting impulsively or yielding under pressure, however great or heavy it may be—trusting first in God and then in the capabilities available to us.

Yet, as I write this article—bearing in mind what I have noted above and fully acknowledging it—I wish to emphasise certain issues that men of the calibre, knowledge, and intelligence of the members of the Transitional Sovereignty Council will not be unaware of. These issues may be summarised as follows:

First:

The battlefield on which they were raised, trained, and mastered its methods—until it became part of their physical and psychological makeup—is one whose defining characteristic is the clear demarcation of ranks and the identification of ally versus enemy. This clarity enables the accurate assessment of positions in time and space, weighing them precisely in scale and significance, and dealing with them accordingly. Such clarity of vision has no equivalent in international relations. In the international system, the constants of military combat are matched by the shifting variables of political positions, where friendship and enmity crystallise according to state interests and within limited timeframes. This necessitates avoiding naïveté or excessive hostility when engaging with them.

Second:

We must recognise that personal temperament and human emotions, in the arena of international relations, can become entry points for exploitation and encroachment upon the rights of a state through which generations pass—without any single generation owning it, let alone an individual. Many rulers have fallen victim to generosity and magnanimity ingrained in their upbringing, conceding vast resources to other states. Later generations of beneficiaries neither thanked them nor did those who lost their rightful claims receive compensation.

Third:

Political systems change in ideology, policy, and alliances—and inevitably in the personalities and stances of their rulers. Consequently, fixed political constants can’t exist between states. What I term “political temperament” (a phrase I introduce here) describes the dominant behaviour of certain individuals who may come to power and misjudge foreign policy priorities. For example, Trump did not govern with the wisdom of Eisenhower, nor did Clinton resemble him. Thus, tethering a state’s political position to personal relationships during a particular era is ill-advised. Foreign policy decisions, especially, must be calculated purely based on national interest, with no room for personal moods or relationships. Many scholars of international relations and interstate crises have documented conflicts arising from poor personal relations between neighbouring rulers—conflicts that cost thousands of lives. Numerous examples are recorded in published works.

This introduction is necessary to the subject of my article, which I now present for discussion and critique.
Sudan previously entered a war between its south and north—an open conflict addressed by various political currents among intellectuals in both regions. For our purposes, we shall focus on the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement led by John Garang, which began in 1983. The Inqaz regime inherited its consequences and performed well militarily, breaking the rebellion’s momentum—yet politically lost the entire south through negotiation.

Many states that the Inqaz government then assumed were allies—based on religion, language, or proximity—stood on the opposite side of the conflict. Emotional logic would have suggested at least neutrality, yet some provided financial and military support to the rebels, contradicting their shared linguistic, religious, and cultural heritage.

The Inqaz regime naïvely built its assumptions on emotional calculations—ethnic or ideological. A review of that period’s records reveals a puzzle between state interests and ethnic, cultural, or ideological composition. Often, external pressures within the complex web of international relations shape state decisions, or political calculations lead states to conclude that the future benefits of a fragmented Sudan outweigh those of a unified one.

Political wisdom now requires us to re-read those positions through the lens of the current Battle of Dignity—from the end of the Inqaz era to the present—analysing state stances to learn lessons and effect course correction.

As I noted in earlier articles, our current Battle of Dignity has already witnessed positive shifts in the positions of many states, including some that had heavily backed the rebellion, and others that adopted ambiguous stances due to perceived self-interest, intertwined interests with other actors, or after realising the defeat of a rebellion they had wagered upon.
Despite its harshness, this experience teaches us the following:

A. We should not place absolute trust in any state, regardless of geographic or cultural proximity, nor delegate our affairs to it or allow it to act on our behalf, however complex the circumstances.

B. We must adhere to the position affirmed by the Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan: any outcomes of bilateral or multilateral meetings concerning Sudan, in which Khartoum was not a party, mean nothing to us—though we may accept what serves Sudan’s interests if we so choose.

Accordingly, the media hype and applause surrounding neighbouring states’ activities with any party on Sudanese matters should be curtailed by decisions that prohibit endorsement or reliance upon such outcomes. This aligns with the Commander-in-Chief’s clarification that these processes occur without our government’s participation. In this regard, I commend the Chairman’s firm response to the proposal of the so-called Massad Boulos—a lesson to anyone who ventures opinions on our affairs without our mandate or consultation, regardless of who empowered them. This is the essence of sovereignty embodied by the members of the Transitional Council.
C. The armed forces possess deep knowledge of the strategies used by major powers to influence weaker states, including:
Blackmail: threats to extract concessions;
Incitement: encouraging rivals to fight wars serving great-power interests;
Attrition: sustaining conflict to exhaust a state economically and militarily;
—and other well-known tactics.

These strategies also apply in political relations, aiming to infiltrate, weaken, and impose conditions that lead to domination.
Given the military gains achieved on the ground—gains that displeased adversaries who either participated in or colluded to ignite the current rebellion—it is unrealistic to expect these adversaries to become close friends overnight after their proxy, the Rapid Support Forces, was defeated. More plausibly, their shift reflects a change in strategy, the nature of the conflict, or the reallocation of interests. This was evident when the British delegation—the penholder in the Security Council—arrived in Port Sudan after a long history of conspiracy, beginning with backing Hamdok’s bid to introduce a Chapter VII force to occupy Sudan under a civilian cover, dismantle the armed forces, and divide the state.

The world assumed it had grasped our weakness in negotiation and our naïveté through the experience of the Naivasha Agreement and the loss of the south. They may now attempt to reshape the political framework away from IGAD, manipulate emotionally proximate states, and entice them with our resources.

Hence the need for vigilance—avoiding the bait—and affirming that the national awakening sparked by the Battle of Dignity has revived a people whose history is rooted in pride, dignity, and discernment.

Major powers operate through regional proxies with calculated malice, climbing over them to reach their goals. It is evident that some regional states are ready to play assigned roles, hoping for rewards from powerful global lobbies—especially in the United States—which act as patrons sustaining their regimes.

Fourth: The War on Resources

The expanding conflict edging toward a third world war is clearly a war over resources. A sovereign president was ousted in Venezuela and replaced with an agent for its oil—openly and unequivocally. Former European allies were threatened with the seizure of Greenland from Denmark for geostrategic positioning and resources—described by a British leader as American Trumpian blackmail and arrogance. The war in Ukraine continues for similar reasons.

Sudan, with its unique geostrategic location and untapped land and resources, is clearly a target. The assault on these resources may be unfolding through an internal agent and a small state we once considered a friend—under the planning of a Zionist-Masonic global order intent on claiming our wealth. Trump justified such moves by arguing that if Greenland were not his, it would fall to China or Russia—revealing the nature of contemporary power struggles.

Fifth: Signs of Regional Alliances

After Trump turned his back on NATO allies, attacked Venezuela, and detained its president, states long reliant on US protection rushed to form regional alliances. Old alliance structures are shifting.

In a multipolar system, alliances are fragile and temporary—often formed to counter an anticipated enemy or weaken a resource-rich state. As the new order has yet to stabilise, alliances remain fluid. Speculated alignments—Saudi-Pakistani versus Emirati-Indian, or Saudi-Egyptian-Turkish versus Israel-UAE-Somaliland—are precautionary manoeuvres amid uncertainty, notably excluding Iran, a key regional power.

All of the above necessitates greater effort to eliminate the remnants of the rebellion, then develop plans to harness and protect our resources through carefully calculated, stable strategic alliances—anchored in our latent wealth and the resolve of our soldiers.

What I have outlined requires an internally cohesive front—immune to infiltration, impossible to mislead, broad-minded, resilient, resolute, and earnest. This is the essential foundation of international relations. I hope to dedicate a separate article to this.

Before concluding, I propose that the Transitional Sovereignty Council establish a political advisory body composed of distinguished ambassadors to provide studies upon which decisions on foreign relations and regional and international power balances can be based.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=10978