Ankara Tests the State, Not the War: What Does It Mean for Sudan to Go to Turkey Now?

Mohannad Awad Mahmoud
The visit of the Chairman of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to Turkey was not a routine protocol stop within an active diplomatic itinerary, nor can it be read as a gesture of political courtesy at a moment of intense internal conflict. This particular visit carries a different meaning altogether, because it speaks to how Ankara views the very nature of the Sudanese state itself, rather than how it assesses the balance of fighting between the army and the terrorist militia. Turkey, unlike many capitals, does not open strategic channels with states it believes have lost their centre or whose institutional reference points have collapsed.
Turkey’s handling of regional crises over the past few years helps clarify the significance of this visit. In Syria, despite its deep disagreement with the regime, Ankara did not recognise any secessionist entities, nor did it seek to dismantle the state or legitimise alternatives to it. Instead, it kept all its actions within the framework of a single state and its internationally recognised borders. In Libya, Turkey disregarded forces that had achieved significant battlefield advances because it viewed them as armed formations operating outside the logic of the state, choosing instead to engage exclusively with the internationally recognised government—despite its weakness—because it represented an institutional framework capable of evolving into a partner. In Somalia, Turkey did not begin through the gateway of weapons or by backing armed local groups, but through building ports, airports, and institutions, because it saw a state that could be rebuilt rather than chaos to be managed indefinitely.
Applying this model to Sudan leads to a clear conclusion: al-Burhan’s visit to Ankara means that Turkey does not read Sudan as a collapsed state, does not believe that the war has eliminated the centre of decision-making, and does not consider the terrorist militia to be a political alternative or a future partner. Ankara does not gamble on militias, does not invest in parallel authorities, and does not build its influence by prolonging disorder. For that reason, merely opening this channel at this moment carries political weight far heavier than any official statement.
The true importance of the visit lies not in what was announced, but in what was left unsaid. Turkey is not a capital of media-driven mediation, nor a state whose actions are preceded by public declarations. It is unlikely that discussions revolved around direct military support, externally imposed transitional arrangements, or mediation between the army and the terrorist militia. Such files are usually handled elsewhere. What matters to Ankara, before any commitment, is the question of the state itself: does central decision-making still exist? Are institutions still standing and capable of functioning? And is there a genuine horizon for a post-war phase?
In this sense, the visit appears closer to a high-level political test than to a ready-made deal—a test of the Sudanese state’s capacity to endure and later to move from managing war to rebuilding institutions. This is precisely what makes the visit more unsettling for the opposing camp than for anyone else, because it strikes at the heart of the narrative built on the claim that Sudan has disintegrated, lost its centre, or that the terrorist militia could be politically recycled under any guise.
Moreover, Turkey’s entry onto the scene—even at this stage, politically rather than practically—breaks the logic of monopoly. Turkey’s presence as an open option means that Sudan is no longer confined to a single track or subjected to the pressure of one actor alone, and that any future arrangements will not be drafted in a single language or according to a single vision. Turkey, with its ability to move from politics to economics and from dialogue to implementation, is not perceived as a passing guest but as a potential actor in the reconstruction moment, once its conditions are in place.
What genuinely worries the affected parties is the possibility that this visit could evolve from an event into a pathway, and from a pathway into a new political reality—one in which Sudan is externally redefined as a state fighting to preserve its unity against a terrorist militia, rather than as an open-ended crisis with no horizon. Such a shift raises the cost of betting on fragmentation and weakens the value of projects built on hollowing out the centre and manufacturing a permanent negotiating reality.
Even if the details of what took place in Ankara are not made public, the meaning is clearer than any communiqué. States are measured not by what they say, but by the doors they choose to open at critical moments. Turkey does not open this door unless it sees a viable state on the other side. In this sense, the Ankara visit was not only about the war, but also about the state itself. And Sudan, simply by knocking on that door, said a great deal—without saying a word.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=9937